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Abstract
This thesis focuses on the political significance o f Kant’s aesthetics, as it is taken up in the
political thought o f Hannah Arendt and Jacques Rancière. While both Arendt and Rancière
model their notions o f political community on Kant’s notion o f sensus communis, or aesthetic
common sense, I point to important differences in their respective appropriations of Kant.
Whereas Arendt draws out o f Kant’s work on aesthetic judgment a politics o f adherence to
common sense (consensus), Rancière looks to Kant’s concepts of disinterest and
disconnection to develop a politics o f “dissensus”, aimed at reconfiguring common sense
along more egalitarian lines. I argue that Rancière’s ability to account, not just for the
aesthetic partitioning o f communities, but also for their radical transformation or re
partitioning through dissensus, makes him better able than Arendt to account for the
introduction o f political subjects rendered invisible and audible by historically cemented
forms o f common sense.

Keywords
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subjectivization.
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Ch. 1 : Introduction

Over the past several decades, Kant’s Critique o f the Power o f Judgment has
spurred a proliferation o f writing and reflection on the implications o f aesthetics beyond
the merely formalistic evaluation o f the beautiful and the sublime. Nowhere is this more
acutely manifest than in the attempt to (re)think the relationship between aesthetics and
politics, and this thesis will focus primarily on the contribution to this effort by Hannah
Arendt and Jacques R ancière.1

Reflection on the relationship between aesthetics and politics is at least as old as
Plato, but these reflections are dominated by a concern with articulating the specific role
that art assumes - or ought to assume - in the realm o f politics. The ‘aesthetic’ in Kant’s
work, however, initiates a whole range o f new problems. While it is true that the third
Critique is a pivotal contribution to the theory o f the evaluation o f artworks, his
articulation o f the sensus communis or ‘communal sense’ also decisively connects the
aesthetic to the political. They are always already linked because community itself
presupposes a shared aesthesis or sensorium, a common way o f perceiving, feeling, and
imparting meaning that enables communication and the collective experience o f a
common world. Both Arendt and Rancière appropriate this insight to articulate a
chiasmatic relationship between aesthetics and politics.

1Major contributions have also come from Theodore Adorno and Pierre Bourdieu, both of whom assume
Kant’s third Critique as a major point of reference.
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The insight that what is communal in community is neither a shared identity
(racial or ethnic), nor Rousseau’s ‘general will’, but a shared sense, a common sense of
the world, can be conceived along the lines o f what Lars Tonder calls ‘inessential
commonality’. (Tender 203) An inessential community has borders that are not static,
that is, not destined to include some and exclude others along fixed and invariable lines.
Whereas one can only ever participate in a common world constituted along the lines of
particular identity traits (race, nationality, gender, citizenship etc.) if one is already a part
o f it, i.e., already posses the essential traits that fit its criteria, community as common
‘sense’ has no essentially determinate participants.

Without doubt, a community grounded in a sensus communis has its own kind of
parameters. One o f the ways Arendt (re)interprets Kant’s common sense, particularly in
her Lectures on K ant's Political Philosophy (1970), is by claiming that it is not a sense
common to everybody, and in the same way. Different historical milieus, with distinct
linguistic, cultural, and historical traditions engender different forms o f common sense,
‘t

which determine and circumscribe the possibilities for political interlocution and action
(LKP 84). What I argue throughout this thesis, however, is that Arendt does not draw out
the most radical consequences o f this insight. If common sense-as the coordinates of
aesthetico-political community-is decisively contingent, particular, and local, rather than
universally identical, is it not conceivable that these very parameters can be contested and
altered? Moreover, might we not surmise that politics has something to do, not just with
what takes place inside the strictures of historically inherited common sense, but that it
might also comprise those processes capable o f transforming it?

3

This is where we turn to the work o f Rancière, whose novel concept of
‘dissensus’ makes precisely such processes o f transformation thinkable. While he shares
with Arendt a conception o f ‘common sense’-w hat he is noted for calling a ‘distribution
o f the sensible’ \partage du sensible]-as the basis o f community, he conceptualizes a
vision o f politics as the re-distribution o f common sense. This theory presupposes the
capacity, not just to speak and act according to the existing strictures o f the community
sense, but to intervene in the connections between words and things, images and
associations, the visible and the invisible, to engender a different sensible world. It allows
for the process o f emancipation-a process not adequately politicized in Arendt’s thoughtthat can introduce new subjects and previously unperceived objects into the common
world. Dissensus, in Rancière’s work, is precisely such a politicization, the rendering
public what was previously cast into the ‘darkness’ o f the private world, as Arendt
frequently describes it.

But the differences between these two thinkers o f the aesthetics o f politics should
\

not be exaggerated, and I hope to shed light on the extent to which their respective
projects are highly complementary. James Ingram, in his “The Subject o f the Politics of
Recognition: Hannah Arendt and Jacques Rancière”, and Andrew Schapp, in his
“Enacting the Right to Have Rights: Jacques Rancière’s critique o f Hannah Arendt”, have
focused on the contrast between their conceptions o f recognition and human rights
respectively, but there is as yet, to the best o f my knowledge, no attempt to think through
the complex relationship between their unique aesthetics o f politics. To this end, I hope to
contribute to the effort to read these two thinkers with and against one another.
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The argument that I develop over the course o f this thesis is the following: an
understanding o f politics as situated immanently within the sensible world, within the
forms o f experience engendered by the historical milieus that we inhabit and which
understands these form s as transformable and mobile, enables a conception o f public or
communal participation that leaves room for the insertion o f contentious and unperceived
subjects.

In order to make this argument, I propose the following itinerary: In the second
chapter I introduce Arendt’s notion o f the public realm as a ‘space o f appearance’ that is
grounded in an aesthetic o f common sense, that is, a public sense or inter-est that frames
community as the perception o f common objects o f concern. This leads to an analysis o f
Arendt’s appropriation o f the sensus communis, in which she makes the decisive link
between the aesthetic-our shared ways o f perceiving and imparting meaning on the
world-and politics, understood as the ability to communicate and debate on the objects
perceived as public. O f special importance here is Arendt’s historicisation o f Kantian
aesthetic common sense, that is, her insistence that common sense is contingent on the
particular historical milieu in which it takes shape, as opposed to being universal and the
same for all peoples. Finally, I argue that Arendt does not draw some o f the important
consequences o f this historicisation, namely the risk that, by determining the parameters
o f intelligible and ‘sensible’ political interlocution, common sense takes on a function o f
constraining the possible participants and modes o f participation in the common. If the
aesthetic coordinates o f the public realm are not understood as susceptible to radical
transformation on the part o f those who are publically invisible and inaudible, then the
struggle for equality on the part o f figures like the sans papiers in France (immigrant
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workers who are denied basic rights by the French State) have no hope o f inserting
themselves into the public realm and being perceived as an issue o f common concern. In
other words, if such figures are to politicize what many would prefer to perceive as their
merely private plight, than politics cannot be reduced exclusively to the inner logic or
common sense o f a given historically situated public realm. This reduction, I argue, is
one that Arendt can be seen to make.

Chapter Three begins with an analysis o f the similarities between Arendt’s and
Rancière’s respective endeavors to fuse the aesthetic and the political. I show how
Rancière’s aesthetics o f politics actually divides into two modalities: ‘consensus’ and
‘dissensus’. Along these lines, I argue that Arendt’s political aesthetics falls under the
former category, whereas Rancière’s falls under the latter. The concept o f dissensus helps
to articulate an aspect o f politics undeveloped in Arendt’s thought, namely those
processes that resist the reification and hegemonization o f the sensus communis,
amending rather than simply dismissing her account o f the public realm.
\
In the final chapter, I oppose the attempt by several commentators on Rancière’s
work to find the analogue for the process of dissensus in the Kantian concept o f the
sublime, a concept that Arendt does not interpret as politically relevant. Because
dissensus is defined by a rupture with the existing modes o f perception and
understanding, such an association is understandable. Nonetheless, I point to the
seemingly overlooked parts o f Rancière’s more recent writings where it is clear that the2

2

Panagia, Davide. The Poetics o f Political Thinking. Durham: Duke UP. 2004. Wolfe, Catherine. “From
Aesthetics to Politics: Kant, Rancière, Deleuze. 2006
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notion o f ‘disinterest’, at the heart o f Kant’s ‘Analytic o f the Beautiful’, provides the
analogue for the process o f dissensus. Disinterest, which is Kant’s term for the negative
relation o f aesthetic experience to any epistemic or moral determination, is a radically
disjunctive, de-contextualizing interruption o f our ‘normal’ ways o f judging our
perceptions. Rancière’s reference to the theory o f the beautiful, which is grounded in the
immanence o f the common world o f sociality (sensus communis), reveals a link between
his own conception o f politics and that o f Arendt, which he situates squarely within the
sensible world. Against the quasi-theological conceptions o f the political which seek to
subordinate politics to an ethics o f the unrepresentable Other-which has more in common
with the experience o f the sublime than the beautiful-Arendt and Rancière attempt to
articulate the inscription o f difference and alterity at the very heart o f the reigning order
o f aesthetic recognition and identification.

2

Ch. 2: Arendt’s Public Realm and the Reified Sensus
Communis

Even the experience o f the m aterially and sensually given world depends upon my being
in contact with other men, upon our common sense which regulates and controls all other
senses and without which each o f us would be enclosed in his own particularity o f sense
data which in themselves are unreliable and treacherous. Only because we have common
sense, that is only because not one man, but men in the plural inhabit the earth can we
trust our immediate sensual experience.
- Hannah Arendt, Origins o f Totalitarianism
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2.1

Introduction
This chapter examines the role o f Kant’s aesthetics in Arendt’s concept of the

‘public realm’, focusing on the affinities that she sees between Kant’s notion o f the
sensus communis, or aesthetic common sense, and her own conception o f the ‘public’
space o f appearances. Throughout her work, Arendt argues that the public realm, as a
space for the exchange o f ‘words and deeds’, relies on a shared, robust sense o f ‘reality’
and its sensible ‘givens’, a ‘communal sense’ which allows the irreducible perspectival
plurality characteristic o f the human condition to coalesce in a common world or ‘inter
est’ wherein political interlocution becomes possible. (HC 57)

I argue that the very same gesture that allows Arendt to conceptualize the public
realm as a space that preserves the integrity o f plurality, also reifies this realm in the
name o f its continuation or ‘permanence’, sealing this space off from the intervention of
new political subjects capable o f transforming it; namely, the orientation o f speech,
judgment, and action toward commonly perceived objects. Such interventions always rely
\

on challenging the ‘given’ world, on contesting what ‘appears’ by altering the sensus
communis, a process that Arendt’s conceptualization does not sufficiently allow for, so I
maintain. Although she effectively historicizes the sensus communis by situating it
immanently within contingent spatiotemporal situations, thereby acknowledging that
changes in the reigning form common sense do in fact occur with shifts in historical
circumstances, as opposed to the ahistorical universally identical common sense
theorized by Kantian transcendental subjectivity, these shifts do not appear to be relevant
for her conception o f political activity. This results, I argue, in a conception o f the
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political that de-politicizes those forms o f action that could alter the public world and the
sensus communis.

In the first part, I look at Arendt’s concept o f the public realm and its aesthetic
foundations in ‘appearance’. Here, I highlight the manner in which, drawing on an
analysis o f Kant’s aesthetics and, in particular, his sensus communis, she uniquely fuses
the aesthetic and the political, and accounts for the commonality o f community by means
o f a ‘common sense’. I shall focus on the aforementioned historicization o f this common
sense. Finally, by looking to the critical reception o f her work on the notion of
community as common sense I will demonstrate that the ‘world’, reified into a
conservative sensus communis, is incapable o f accounting for radical political
transformation and the introduction o f the genuinely new, as she claims it does.

2.2

2 .2 .1

The Aesthetics o f Arendt’s Public Realm:

Plurality and Public Commonness

The impact o f Arendt’s experience as a German Jew living through the calamitous
events o f Twentieth Century totalitarianism and war on her theoretical work has been
widely recognized and analyzed by her commentators, and it cannot be overstated. In
these events, she saw the culmination o f a contempt for the unpredictability and plurality
o f the human condition, which is at least as old as Plato’s flight from the realm of
appearance for the realm o f ideas. Arendt was also heavily influenced by her experience
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o f post-war America, however, and the rule o f consumer society and individualism that
she perceived there. Perhaps the principal thread that ties Arendt’s vast corpus together
into a unified project is the struggle to articulate how to preserve the realm o f the political
as a domain o f difference, newness and singularity against the totalitarian tendency to
level down and eliminate the manifestation o f human uniqueness, while at the same time
preserving the integrity o f a life in common with others.

Ultimately, Arendt found the model she was seeking in the notion o f the public
realm. Inspired by the ancient Greek polls and the Roman res publica, Arendt conceived
the public realm as an agonistic space o f great ‘words and deeds’ that, while gathering
diverse individuals into a common space, allowed the singularity o f each participant to
become manifest and be witnessed by the ‘spectators’ o f the public sphere (HC 57). In
The Human Condition, she argues that what distinguishes the public realm from the
private and social (economic) realms is that ‘appearance’ is all that matters, and she
refers to it as a space o f appearances. “The term ‘public’,” she explains, “signifies two
closely interrelated but not altogether identical phenomena... first, that everything that
appears in public can be seen and heard by everybody and has the widest possible
publicity. For us appearance-something that is being seen and heard by others as well as
by ourselves-constitutes reality.” (HC 50) And “second, the term ‘public’ signifies the
world itself, in so far as it is common to all and is distinguished from our privately owned
place in it.” (HC 52)

What holds a community together in the public realm is appearance. Although
different perspectives are constitutive o f it, everybody in the public realm ultimately sees
the same things; “differences o f position and the resulting variety o f perspectives
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notwithstanding, everybody is always concerned with the same object.” (HC 58) This
concern with the same objects o f appearance constitutes for Arendt what she calls an
inter-est between one another, something “which lies between people and therefore can
relate and bind them together.” (HC 182) What is important, for Arendt, is that it is not
identity that constitutes community, but the sharing o f a ‘sense’ o f reality, which at once
retains plurality o f perspectives and commonness. Inter-est, as Lisa Disch claims, “is the
same but nonidentical object o f public concern.” (Disch 143) The exchange o f diverse
and singular words and deeds proper to the public realm relies on a common world in
which this diversity can coalesce. Without this inter-est (being-between), shared meaning
and understanding collapses, and with it the base level o f sameness against the
background o f which the revelatory and individuating manifestation o f difference
characteristic o f action and speech unfold. While action and speech aim to “distinguish
oneself from all others,” (HC 49) “most action and speech is concerned with this inbetween. .. so that most words and deeds are about some worldly objective reality.” (HC
182) Public inter-est is best conceived, not as the sufficient guarantor p f unity among
diverse individuals, but as the necessary common (aesthetic) space for such unity to be
possible in the fist place.

To the same extent that the inter-est of the public realm binds-together diverse
individuals, however, it also allows Arendt to partition off the modalities o f human
activity that qualify as political, from those that do not. In particular, it is the activities of
‘action’ and ‘speech’ that colour the common world: “most words and deeds are about
some worldly objective reality.” (HC 182) Action and speech differ from other human
activities in that they relate to the uniquely human condition which for Arendt is defined
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by ‘natality’ (the fact that new possibilities enter the world with every child birth) and
‘plurality’ (that no two people are identical). (HC 178) “If action corresponds to the fact
o f birth,” explains Arendt, “if it is the actualization o f the human condition o f natality,
then speech corresponds to the fact of distinctiveness and is the actualization, that is, of
living as a distinct and unique being among equals.” (HC 178) Action and speech are not
defined by the instrumental logic o f production (they do, strictly speaking, produce
anything), but by what and who they reveal. This emphasis on revelation, moreover,
discloses the crucial role that spectatorship plays in the public realm, to the extent that its
participants always witness and judge the speech and action o f others. Only action and
speech enact human being-together, because they appeal to, and are even constituted by,
the presence o f others who witness them. To this end, Arendt is careful to distinguish the
‘reality’ o f one’s private world from “the reality rising out o f the sum total of aspects
presented by one object to a multitude o f spectators,” (HC 57) which she privileges. This
‘sum total o f aspects’ thickens the texture o f the shared world, a thickening that cannot
take place within the confines o f the private sphere.

In contrast to action and speech, and their judgment by spectators, ‘labour’ and
‘work’, the two other activities proper to the human condition, do not qualify as political
for Arendt. Labour, as “the activity which corresponds to the biological process of the
human body,” (HC 7) and work, which “provides the ‘artificial’ world o f things,
distinctly different from all natural surroundings,” (HC 7) she maintains, do not address
themselves to the ‘human condition’ o f plurality, the condition sine qua non o f “all
political life.” (HC 7) Action, conversely, is “the only activity that goes on directly
between men without the intermediary o f things or matter, [and] corresponds to the
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human condition o f plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on earth and inhabit the
world.” (HC 7) Unlike labour and work, the stakes o f action are fundamentally
communicative, and Arendt explicitly claims that “most political action... is indeed
transacted in words.” (HC 26)

Arendt’s claim that labour and work are not, strictly speaking, political
categories, is also tied to her insistence that the ‘freedom’ characteristic o f political life
must be distinguished from the ‘necessity’ that dominates social and economic life, a
distinction whose neglect was, for Arendt, at the heart o f totalitarianism. She argues that
it is a perversion o f the essence o f politics to maintain that “the life process o f society is
the center o f human endeavor.” (OR 58) Social and economic life, for Arendt, is carried
out in the ‘darkness’ o f the private realm, which for her includes not just the home but the
workplace, public institutions such as schools, etc. And because, in Arendt’s conception
o f politics, “nothing matters that cannot make itself seen and heard,” and “visibility and
audibility are o f prime importance,” (HAR 233) only that space o f appearances that is the
\

public realm is properly political.

What I wish to emphasize in Arendt’s conception o f the public realm is the extent
to which it relies on a strong sense of the world as it appears to everyone. Publicness
requires a ‘common sense’, which adjusts our private realities to the objects o f perception
and ways o f perceiving shared by others, opening up the possibility o f speaking to one
another about them. “The only character o f the world by which to gauge its reality,”
Arendt argues, “is its being common to us all, and common sense occupies such a high
rank in the hierarchy o f political qualities because it is the one sense that fits into reality
as a whole our five strictly individual senses and the strictly particular data they
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perceive.” (HC 208) The fact that, already in The Human Condition, Arendt equates “the
atrophy o f the space o f appearances [with]... the withering o f common sense,” (HC 209)
reveals that o f a robust sense o f the given world (‘reality’) is constitutive o f her concept
o f the public.

2 .2 .2

Common Sense from the Transcendental to the Historical:
Arendt’s concern, manifest throughout her oeuvre, with appearance as the

defining feature o f politics and the public realm bespeaks an awareness o f the centrality
o f aesthetics to politics. Nevertheless, it is not until her engagement with Kant’s principal
treatise on aesthetics, namely The Critique o f the Power o f Judgment, that this centrality
becomes explicit. Arendt sees in Kant’s notion o f ‘taste’ as a sensus communis, or
aesthetic common sense, the basis for sociability and publicity, which are at the core of
her political theory. In what follows, I examine Arendt’s appropriation of Kant’s
aesthetics, and specifically her historicisation o f the sensus communis, that is, her
S

assertion that common sense is not universally identical for all people, but is contingent
on the cultural, linguistic, and historical particularities o f a given people. (LKP 84) While
Arendt is right to undermine the universalizing thrust o f Kantian transcendental common
sense, which conceives o f common sense as transcendent to historical contingencies, I
argue that she does not address some o f the major considerations that arise from this
undermining. In her desire to affirm the permanence o f the world and preserve the
integrity o f the inter-est, she does not adequately address the potential for the sensus
communis to reify into an ideological and reactionary force, foreclosing the radical
intervention o f new actors and new objects o f common concern.
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Aesthetics & Politics in K ant's Third Critique: Arendt was never able to write the third
and final volume o f her seminal Life o f the Mind, which was to be entitled “Judging”, and
which was to deal extensively with Kant’s third Critique. In the absence o f this volume,
we are left with the collection o f lectures that Arendt delivered in 1970, which have been
compiled and edited by Ronald Beiner and published as Lectures on K ant’s Political
Philosophy. Aside from scattered references throughout her oeuvre, these lectures contain
Arendt’s most explicit attempt to make out o f Kant’s reflections on the nature o f the
beautiful the basis o f a politics o f judgment, opinion, and publicity.

Arendt begins her Lectures with a justification o f the centrality o f Kant’s
aesthetics to what ought to be considered his ‘political philosophy’. Against the dominant
tradition o f Kant scholarship, she privileges the third Critique over his moral treatises
(Critique o f Practical Reason, the Groundwork and the Metaphysics o f Morals) as well as
his more directly ‘political writings’ (Perpetual Peace, Cosmopolitanism With a
Universal Intent etc.). As Arendt explains, “Kant became aware o f the political as distinct
from the social, as part and parcel o f man’s condition in the world, rather late in life,
when he no longer had either the strength or the time to work out his own philosophy on
this particular matter.” {LKP 9) For Arendt, far from consisting in a combination of his
moral and political writings, it is in Kant’s aesthetics, and in particular his theory of
aesthetic or reflective judgment, that his most important political legacy lies, and it is the
Critique o f the Power o f Judgment that “actually should have become the book that
otherwise is missing in Kant’s great work.” {LKP 9)

So what is it about Kant’s aesthetic writings that stands apart from the rest of his
work, as well as from the whole tradition o f political philosophy? For Arendt, the answer
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lies in what she identifies as a propensity toward ‘sociability’ revealed in his analysis of
judgments o f taste. Kant’s turn toward such judgments, in his later writings, foregrounds
a subjective capacity that is not reducible to the faculties o f ‘understanding’ and ‘reason,’
which dominate his earlier critical philosophy. This is significant, for Arendt, because
these faculties are by definition not in need o f the presence o f other human beings and are
decidedly transcendent to the earthly realm o f appearances and intersubjectivity. This is
evident in Kant’s repeated description o f the cognitive structures o f understanding and
reason as proper to any intelligent being in the universe whatsoever. (C P J 195)

Kant’s turn toward judgment, however, marks a politically promising shift in that
it concerns a subjective capacity that is essentially dependent on, and demands
sociability, a being-with-others in a common world, and is thus intimately tied up with
the immanence o f the world. As Arendt explains, “the most decisive difference between
the Critique o f Practical Reason and the Critique ofJudgm ent is that the moral laws of
the former are valid for all intelligible beings, whereas the rules o f the latter are strictly
limited in their validity to human beings on earth.” (LKP 13) It is precisely this
immanence to the world essential to aesthetic judgment that makes the third Critique
“more closely connected with the political than anything in the other Critiques.” (LKP
13)

Indeed, Arendt sees her own distinction between the private and the public, so
crucial to her theorization o f politics (which strictly concerns the public world), as being
lodged at the heart o f Kant’s third Critique. For Kant, the pleasure derived from
experiences o f the beautiful must be sharply distinguished from what he refers to as mere
feelings o f ‘charm’ or the ‘agreeable’ {CPJ 96). The agreeable is a strictly private,
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idiosyncratic partiality toward a sensation o f one sort or another, and by definition does
not expect the agreement or approval o f anyone else. “With regard to the agreeable,”
explains Kant, “everyone is content that his judgment, which he grounds on a private
feeling, and in which he says o f an object that it pleases him, be restricted merely to his
own person.” (C P J91) Already in The Human Condition, Arendt contends that “while
the public realm may be great, it cannot be charming precisely because it is unable to
harbor the irrelevant.” (HC 52) What is ‘relevant’ always pertains to the world and its
attendant problems and possibilities; it is relevant to others, as well as to oneself, which
is not the case for the idiosyncratic concerns o f private life. Whereas ‘understanding’ and
‘reason’ are universally necessary, regardless o f the contingencies o f the judging subject,
and the ‘agreeable’ is completely contingent on private, subjective whim, ‘judgment’ is
immanently tied up sociability, i.e., to the ways that others judge the objects of the
common world. What both the universal- legislative and private- idiosyncratic modes of
judging have in common is that they are solitary and worldless, lacking any reference to
the ways o f feeling and judging o f other people.

s

Kant’s descriptions o f aesthetic judgments, however, are markedly different, and
the ‘Analytic o f the Beautiful’ is laden with a similar vocabulary to the one Arendt uses
to describe publicity, namely, ‘communicability’, ‘agreement’, and ‘sociability’. When
we judge something as beautiful, Kant suggests, we expect the ‘assent’ o f others, and are
not likely be satisfied with the idea that this judgment is strictly personal. Far from being
idiosyncratic, we expect that our judgments o f the beautiful are “generally valid (public)
judgments.” (CPJ 99)
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One o f the defining features o f aesthetic judgments is that they are ‘reflective’,
rather than ‘determining’. Determining judgments mechanistically subsume
particularities under the universal concepts o f the understanding (cognition), whereas
reflective judgments lack immediate recourse to a concept, suspending the determining
function o f cognition. But one should not be mislead into conceiving o f Kantian
reflection as, in the first instance, introspective. Aesthetic reflection differs from our
contemporary understanding o f the term, and does not involve searching within ones self,
as it were, but is essentially other-directed. It appeals to common sense, to what Kant, in
his appropriation o f the Latin term, calls a sensus communis. What Kant sought in the
idea o f a sensus communis was a standard for deciding on matters o f taste that neither
relied on objectivity nor on pure subjective whim, but which provided an ‘impartial’
standpoint from which to render generally valid judgments, that is, from which a truly
public judgment could be made. “By ‘sensus communis’,” he explains, “must be
understood the idea o f a communal sense i.e., a faculty forjudging that in its reflection
takes account (apriori) o f everyone else’s way o f representing in thought...” (C P J 173)
For Kant, this does not mean that reflective judgment empirically reaches out to
individuals and asks about their particular feeling in relation to a given object. As Arendt
explains in her essay “The Crisis in Culture”, “the thinking process which is active in
judging something is not, like the thought process o f pure reasoning, a dialogue between
me and myself, but finds itself always and primarily, even i f la m quite alone in making
up my mind, in an anticipated communication with others with whom I must finally come
to some agreement.” [italics added] (BPF 220)
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For Arendt, it is o f no small significance that Kant chose to use the Latin term
‘sensus communis, ’ rather than simply using the popular expression ‘common sense’.
Throughout his work, Kant applied the term ‘common sense’ both to the capacities o f the
understanding and to practical reason. Common sense - both in common parlance and in
Kant’s sense - indicates a capacity shared by everyone in their respective private uses o f
it, i.e., in their solitary epistemic and practical judgments. “By using the Latin term,”
however, “Kant indicates that here he means something different: an extra sense... that
fits us into community.” (LKP 70) This ‘extra’ sense, which ‘fits us into community’, is
the aesthetic basis o f the political for Arendt; it bespeaks the manner in which human
sensation adjusts according to the ways o f sensing and perceiving proper to the
community in which one has grown and are embedded. Sensing-with (con-sensus) lies at
the heart o f our ability to form opinions and actions whose scope and interest (inter-est)
extend from our private, individual world, to the world we share in common with others.

One can argue, therefore, that Arendt sees in Kant’s aesthetics a model o f judging
that resolves the tension between irreducible plurality and commonness, which animates
her theoretical work from its very beginning. Aesthetic judgments reveal that the plurality
o f perspectives can coalesce in a common world (sensus communis), without this
resulting in the erasure o f that plurality. Epistemic or moral judgments cannot achieve
this because they leave no room for debate, dialogue, and the appearance o f different
people to one another. Aesthetic judgments, conversely, cannot be made without appeal
to the sociability o f the common world, to the ways o f sensing and ‘representing’ proper
to other people. As Andrew Norris asserts, Arendt presents the political realm as:
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one in which opinion and judgment as such are capable of achieving
impartiality without relying upon either the unity of the will or the coercion of
cognition. At the end of her life, Arendt turned to Kant’s Critique o f Judgment
for a model of how this inherently public opinion might be conceived. In spite
of Kant’s own hostility toward rhetoric, his discussion of aesthetic, reflective
judgment offers an account of how political speech and opinion might achieve
impartiality in a form other than objectivity. (Norris 1996)

Borrowing Kant’s own expression, Arendt calls this ‘public’ opinion an ‘enlarged
mentality’. Such a ‘mentality’, enriched by the intercourse o f the public realm, is the
ideal o f Arendtian politics.

Historicizing the Sensus Communis: Arendt is open about the fact that her
interpretation o f Kant stretches or even redefines his own proper terms, claiming to be
faithful to the ‘spirit’ o f his work and not primarily concerned with exegetical accuracy.
(LKP 33) Indeed, Arendt’s particular historical inflection o f Kant’s sensus communis has
far reaching consequences for the kind o f politics that she sees Kant’s aesthetics as
making possible, and indicates that the transcendence endemic to Kant’s unworldly
transcendental subject is not sufficient for a thinking o f an earthbound-politics. If one
were to pose the question to Kant directly, “To whom is common sense common?” his
answer would most certainly be “humanity as such”. Arendt, however, answers
differently. Beginning with her essay “Understanding and Politics”, she explicitly inserts
common sense into historical and cultural contexts. (£ t/3 1 7 ) Not yet indexing her use of
the term to Kant’s aesthetics, she insists that there is a web o f pre-understandings proper
to different cultures that constitutes the particular character o f a given people’s political
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life. In this essay, Arendt describes common sense as “that portion o f inherited wisdom
which all men have in common in a given civilization" [italics added] (£(7317)

Whereas Kant places the sensus communis squarely in the general structure of
human subjectivity proper to the transcendental subject-albeit, one that is always situated
on earth and in human society-Arendt sees the sensus communis as historically
embedded in our cultural inheritances. In Michael Gottsegen’s words, “Arendt turns
Kant’s analytic in a direction that adds credence to a conception o f political discourse and
political judgment that is rooted in a web o f norms, values, and principles that are
contingently interwoven and spatiotemporally localized.” (Gottsegen, PTH 180) Arendt
remarks, in the Lectures, that Kant lacks a sense o f history altogether, and notes that the
historical situatedness o f man in general was not integral to Kant’s philosophy. “In
Kant,” she explains, “history is part o f nature; the historical subject is the human species
understood as part o f the creation, though as its final end creation’s crown, so to speak.”
(LKP 8) This lack o f a sense o f history, evidently, has consequences for how Kant’s own
understanding o f the sociability at the heart of the sensus communis oiight to be
understood. While the third Critique is characterized by an ambivalence about the
historicity o f the sensus communis-given that it is the properly human capacity, and not a
faculty o f all rational beings in the universe-it must be remembered that this sense is
ultimately a “faculty for judgment” that “holds our judgments up to human reason as a
whole” (C P J 156). Though strictly human, Kant’s sensus communis is identical
regardless o f the place or time in human history in which it is set to (reflective) work.

Arendt, conversely, suggests in her essay “The Crisis in Culture” that taste can be
conceived as a cultura animi (cultivation o f soul) that consists o f those narrated tales and
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recounted actions, venerated artworks and sacred texts that attest to the “temporal
transcendence o f the public realm itself.” (B P F 159) This cultura animi provides the
forms o f expression through which a people perceive and describe the world in common.
It shapes a public ‘imagination’, filtering the perception o f particular objects or events
through recognizable categories, names, and modes o f evaluation. “As such, imagination
‘determines the sensibility a priori,’ it is inherent in all sense perceptions. Without it,
there would be neither the objectivity o f the world-that it can be known - nor any
possibility o f communication-that we can talk about it.” (LKP 84) Imagination provides,
for example, “a language which enables the citizen who stands before the community to
speak o f (for example) freedom and tyranny and to be understood. As such it is a
language which enables the citizen to exercise his judgment in a publically
comprehensible fashion.” (Gottsegen, PTH, 148) Certainly, ‘public comprehensibility’
does not mean that everyone agrees on the judgments that are exercised, for the public
realm is defined by agonistic disagreement and debate. Nevertheless, it does guarantee a
basic level o f agreement about what is being judged, about the reality o f the object
present before the eyes and ears o f the public.

Thus, the sensus communis ought to be understood as playing two interconnected
but distinct roles in Arendt’s conception o f the public realm: it functions both as a
transcendental structure and as a normative measure. The transcendental function is
found in the concept o f imagination, described above. The concept o f imagination is the
‘a priori’ basis o f communicability. As Arendt claims “what makes particulars
communicable is (a) that in perceiving a particular we have in the back o f our minds... a
‘schema’ whose ‘shape’ is characteristic o f many such particulars and (b) that this
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schematic shape is in the back o f the minds o f many different people. These schematic
shapes are products o f the imagination...” (LKP 83) Imagination is central to our ability
to compose statements and initiate actions that are publically comprehensible, indexing
our acts, expressions and judgments to the horizon o f pre-understandings that are the
substance o f a community, so that they may be meaningfully perceived and understood
by others. Secondly, the sensus communis is said to enable reflection, which plays a
normative function. Impartiality, toward which reflective judgment strives, subjects our
judgments to the constraints o f general validity. As I explained above, reflection is otherdirected and searches among the ways o f representing and judging proper to others for
the appropriate judgment to be rendered. Whereas imagination creates the standards
according to which we judge, reflection attempts to meet them by rendering publically
valid judgments. The aesthetic categories o f imagination and reflection provide Arendt
with a framework for a conception o f the common that simultaneously once allows for
perspectival plurality and disagreement, while carrying with it the promise of
communication, mutual understanding, and impartiality.

2.3 Reification of the Historical sensus communis
The fact that Arendt conceives o f the sensus communis as embedded in historical
worlds and cultural imaginaries presents her with a number o f problems that do not
constrain Kant: What, for example, are the political stakes o f the fact that the sensus
communis can and does change? How do different common senses-since for Arendt there
are a plurality o f them-interact with one another? If the sensus communis is contingent
and historical, and thus changeable, is it conceivable that politics, beyond simply

23

accommodating the existing coordinates o f communication and impartial validity, might
also involve attempts to challenge these coordinates by radically contesting the existing
cultural imagination?
Arendt opens something radical up by placing the sensus communis in the meaningcontexts and pre-understandings o f the world and not in the mind. Nevertheless, I would
argue that she does not bring this radical gesture to its furthest consequences. Her work
seems to show a greater concern for preserving a robust sense o f the given in the face of
its contingency, privileging the survival and permanence o f the world to its radical
reconfiguration. In Arendt’s words, “the existence o f a public realm and... a community
o f things which gathers men together and relates them to each other depends entirely on
permanence. If the world is to contain a public space, it cannot be erected for one
generation and planned for the living only; it must transcend the life-span o f mortal
men.” (HC 55) Likewise, as James Ingram summarizes Arendt’s position, “the highest
purpose o f politics is to ensure through action the continued existence o f a world in
which politics, and thus freedom, plurality, and action, is possible.” (Ingram, SPR 235) I
do not wish to argue against Arendt’s emphasis on the continuation and thickening of the
world as a necessary condition for politics. The potential for the disintegration o f a
common world, the usurpation o f the public realm by private and social activities plainly
threatens the possibility o f politics.3 I am interested, rather, in what aspect o f politics is
lost in this emphasis. There is a danger, I would argue, that Arendt’s emphasis on the

3

One could argue that contemporary ‘market’ societies persistently threaten the existence of public space,
and thus of politics. The reduction of parliamentary ‘politics’ to state and economic administration-what
Arendt herself calls ‘national housekeeping’-and the private ownership of the media are two of the primary
means by which capitalist societies replace the common world with one that is administered in a
unidirectional manner by the existing forms of power.
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‘continued existence’ o f the world risks overlooking the tendency for the sensus
communis to reify into a reactionary and hegemonic structure. One o f the consequences
o f historicizing the sensus communis, a consequence that, in my opinion, Arendt does not
sufficiently address, is that it must be understood as embedded in discursive and
ideological frameworks that legitimate and reproduce certain conditions in a given
situation, including the conditions o f injustice and inequality. Racism and xenophobia,
for example, are often perpetuated by a sensus communis, composed o f ‘images’ and
‘concepts’ that organize our perception o f and judgments concerning certain classes of
people.

Such a tendency for common sense to reify requires accounting for modes of
political activity that can radically challenge, and not only enrich or prolong, the inter-est
o f the public world. I would argue that such challenges, moreover, are rarely ‘publically
comprehensible’, because their very aim is to subvert and reorganize the register of
intelligibility and common sense. In certain circumstances, therefore, the notion that an
act or a judgment is genuinely political only if it issues from and appeals to common
sense may be insufficient. While I do not mean to suggest, as some have , that the goings
on o f the public realm are destined to the mere repetition o f the same, it seems fair to
presume that the constraints o f communicability and impartiality could prevent the
presentation o f legitimately political actions that do not conform to the existing
coordinates o f the public realm and the sensus communis. It is therefore reasonable to
surmise that politics must involve instances where the introduction o f new subjects and4

4 Homi K. Bhaba, The Location o f Culture, 190-192
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objects o f common perception and concern requires a radical break and shift in the public
inter-est itself.

In his Metapolitics (2005), Alain Badiou argues something to this effect. He
describes Arendt’s “peculiar neo-Kantianism” as engendering a type o f , structured by the
foreclosure o f radical difference under the guise o f the ‘plurality o f opinions’. I quote him
at length:

Let us call ‘community’ plurality as such; the being-together, or in-common,
of the plurality of men. Let us call ‘common sense’ the resource of judgment
directly bound to this plurality. Arendt’s formula is then the following ‘The
criterion is communicability, and the standard of deciding about it is common
sense’... ‘Communicability’ suggests that the plurality of opinions is
sufficiently wide-ranging to accommodate difference. And yet everyone
knows from experience that this is inaccurate, and that there is no place for
debating genuinely alternative opinions, which at best are subject to dispute.
With ‘common sense’ one provides a norm which is in actual fact
transcendent, because it suggests, not only plurality, but a subjective unity of
this plurality, at least in principle. This concession to the One undoes the
radicality o f the multiple, which had allegedly been guaranteed. It opens the
way to a doctrine of consensus[...]. (Badiou, MP 18)

While Arendt tends to be pre-occupied with the inner workings o f the public realm, with
s

the dynamics o f reflection, speech and action as they unfold in the enclosure o f public
space, Badiou draws attention to the rigidity o f the parameters that make such a political
enclosure possible. In spite of Arendt’s desire to balance uniqueness and singularity with
the commonness o f a shared sense o f the world, Badiou suggests that this sense can reify
into a transcendent limit, guarding the public realm from politically transformative
interventions and compromising the potential for radical disagreement and dissimilarity.
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Badiou’s critique is based on what he interprets as the self-referential and closed
process o f opinion formation, or the genesis o f politically appropriate, impartial
judgments. He writes:
Opinion is formed as the general exercise of ‘sharing the world with others’.
One recognizes what is at stake in this attempt: to assign the formation of
opinions to the plural itself, to make it the immediate subjectification of beingtogether. The price paid for this move is a severe restriction as to what an
opinion is - let’s be clear: as to what a politically justified opinion is... For
this is an opinion which at least bears a trace of its protocol of formation, and
which therefore remains homogeneous to the persistence o f being-together, or
the share (portage). (Badiou, MP 19)

On Badiou’s account, Arendt’s ‘plurality’ is domesticated within the more
comprehensive unity and sameness o f political community qua public realm and sensus
communis. Recall that the process o f reflection indexes the plurality o f perspectives to
fixed examples-stories, schemas, images etc.-through which the plurality o f opinions are
distributed according to the normative strictures of communicability and the common
world. In Arendt’s promotion o f those forms o f action and speech that cohere with the
sense o f ‘reality’ proper to the public realm, Badiou argues, she forecloses those realityshattering events and processes from her conception o f political life. Gottsegen
corroborates Badiou’s objection to Arendt’s politics when he claims that “the judging
process itself, as a consequence of the prominence given to an ‘exemplary’ past by the
sensus communis, emerges as essentially conservative.” (Gottsegen, PTH 200)

In some ways, this is not exactly a fair characterization o f Arendt’s politics. In
response to the accusation that her conception o f the political leaves little if any room for
heterogeneous, transformative action, she would likely point to her notions o f ‘thinking’
and ‘responsibility’, which mutually support one another, and which, moreover, are
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intended precisely to articulate the appropriate political response to ‘evil’ and injustice.
At certain historical junctures, such as that o f totalitarianism, when common sense begins
to ‘wither away’ into a mere ideological (un)thinking, genuine thinking requires that one
break with the tacitly accepted opinions and automatically obeyed rules dominant. The
lesson o f Adolf Eichmann’s participation in one o f the grossest injustices in history (the
Holocaust), Arendt argues in Eichmann in Jerusalem, is precisely that evil is ‘banal’ to
the extent that, far from involving any diabolical profundity, his actions merely resulted
from “an inability to think”. (EJ 49) This means, for Arendt, that Eichmann lacked the
ability “to think from the standpoint o f somebody else.” (E J 49) Reiterating this point in
her essay “Truth and Politics”, she claims that Eichmann lacked the “capacity for an
‘enlarged mentality’ that enables men to judge.” (Arendt, “TP” 556)

In contrast to Eichmann’s deficiency, she points to those few figures who, out of
their capacity to think, assumed responsibility for the world to which they belonged by
doing precisely what Eichmann claimed was impossible or futile: they refused to
participate, even if it meant sacrificing their lives. These “nonparticipators in public life
under a dictatorship” (RJ 47) adhered to an ethics that, according to Arendt, is Socratic in
origin, an ethics that holds that “it is better to suffer wrong than to do wrong.” (RJ 151)
Their refusal was not out o f sympathy or even empathy, but rather a capacity to
imaginatively occupy the perspectives o f those who would suffer as a result o f their
compliance, participation, and tacit approval; such figures acted out o f responsibility,
“dared to judge for themselves.” (RJ 44)

Nonetheless, Arendt’s concepts o f thinking and responsibility do not provide a
satisfying answer to the problems I have been raising. First, as Isabelle Herzog argues in
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her essay “Hannah Arendt’s Concept o f Responsibility”, the capacity to think and assume
responsibility for the acts committed in and by one’s community presupposes that one
already belongs to and can participate in a political community. For Arendt, argues
Herzog, “an agent will be held responsible for his/her words and deeds only if s/he
belongs to a public sphere at the moment o f his/her acts.” (Herzog, “HAC” 43) In her
Responsibility and Judgment, Arendt makes this point plainly: “the twentieth century has
created a category o f men who were truly outcasts, belonging to no internationally
recognizable community whatsoever, the refugees and stateless people, who indeed can
not be held politically responsible for anything.” ( R J 150) They are “the only totally
nonresponsible people.” (RJ 150) This category o f people who lack a definite polity
evidently do not have the option o f “nonparticipation” in public life, since they never
participated in it in the first place. It is precisely these figures, secondly, that I would
argue have the potential to pose a definite challenge to, rather than a mere withdrawal
from the reified and ideological world in which they lack a definite place. Whereas
Arendt de-politicizes those outside or at the margins o f a given political community, I
would maintain that they are, and have shown themselves to be, capable o f engaging in
political modes o f action that transform the public realm from which they are excluded. I
do not mean to suggest by this that the acts o f thought and responsibility described above
have no consequences in the world in and against which they are performed. Rather, as I
argue at greater length in the next chapter, the position o f exception and exclusion
occupied by those rendered invisible/inaudible by the communal sense o f the public
realm is one whose politicization is uniquely able to reconfigure the very aesthetic
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coordinates o f the public realm, making new issues appear as common concerns and new
judgments as ‘generally valid’.

In spite o f the one-sidedness o f Badiou’s critique o f Arendt, therefore, he is
nonetheless right to ask why, for Arendt, politics is not conceivable “as a thinkable
modification o f public space,” (Badiou, M P 13) rather than as either participation (or, in
situations o f gross injustice, nonparticipation) therein. In his essay “Aesthetics and
Politics in Kant and Arendt”, Anthony Cascardi puts forth a similar point to Badiou,
arguing that “Arendt favors a politics o f rational communication over a politics of
transformation.” (Cascardi, “CT” 113) By grounding her politics exclusively on the
communicable and the publically representable, according to Cascardi, Arendt nullifies a
tension endemic to reflections on the political, “between rationality as communication
grounded in common sense, and a transformative vision that relies on the feelings
generated by those things that stand beyond the available limits o f representation.”
(Cascardi, “CT” 113)
s
In the same volume5, Nancy Fraser responds to Cascardi’s essay by arguing that
such a tension is in fact preserved in Arendt’s conception o f politics. She asserts that
Cascardi’s “contrast between the politics o f communication with the politics of
transformation is misleading and overdrawn.” (Fraser, “CTC” 168) There is no reason,
according to Fraser, that these two dimensions o f politics cannot be reconciled to one
another. For Fraser, “one should try to do precisely what Cascardi faulted Arendt for
attempting; namely, to construct a middle position between pure communication and pure

5 Calhoune & McGowan, Hannah Arendt and the Meaning o f Politics.
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transformation, a position ‘that resolves the tension’ between them.” (Fraser, “CTC” 169)
In many ways, however, Fraser overlooks the essence o f the problem. What is being
disputed is not whether Arendt does or does not attempt to construct such a position, but
rather whether she succeeds in doing so.

Arendt claims in her Lectures that “all single agreements or disagreements
presuppose that we are talking about the same thing - that we, who are many, agree,
come together, on something that is one and the same for all o f us.” (LKP 83) This
second level o f agreement, the level of common sense that circumscribes and determines
the stakes o f all action, speech, and judgment, must itself be subjected to a disputes, lest it
reify into an order-of-things immune from subjective intervention. So long as we
maintain that, while we may dispute about different aspects o f the world, “the world itself
is an objective datum,” (BPF 222) the reification o f the public realm and common sense
is a real danger.

We may agree with Fraser that, while defending the integrity o f politics as
\

concerned with what can be represented and communicated, “we ought to be interested in
what (and who) can’t be represented within some given, historically and spatially located
discursive regime." (Fraser, “CTC”, 169) But my contention is that such an interest
necessitates an account o f the mechanisms or processes capable not just o f contesting
these historical regimes, but o f introducing invisible and inaudible subjects into the
existing space o f appearances. As far as I am able to tell, Arendt’s account of the sensus
communis as the condition o f political community does not provide such an account. An
account o f this sort, I contend, would involve submitting the ‘given world’ itself to
radical intervention transformation.
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2.4 Conclusion

One o f the things that is o f great value in Arendt’s reflections on the nature of
judgment is that they reveal, via the notion o f the sensus communis, that political
community-which in her view is a community o f people speaking, acting, and judging in
the presence o f others-always presupposes an aesthetic community, a shared modality of
sensing and feeling the world. For Arendt, these modalities, as I have tried to show, are
deeply rooted in particular historical milieu, rather than in the universally identical mind
o f the transcendental subject. I also argue, however, that Arendt’s attempt to engender
worldly solidity and a robust common sense falls over into a structure that appears
immune to interventions by excluded and unperceived political subjects. The public
realm, restricted to appearances - to public words and deeds - risks becoming
conservative.
\

I have sought to show that those elements that are most radical in Arendt’s worksuch as her non-essentialist conception o f community (as semdinter-est), and her
account o f action and speech as opening up singular and unprecedented sequences of
events-are compromised by her insistence on the permanence and survival o f the public
world and its sensus communis. In the following chapter, I look to the work o f Jacques
Rancière for a way o f preserving Arendt’s insights about the sensus communis as the
condition o f action, speech, and judgment, while pointing to his unique ability to account
for the transformation o f common sense. The object o f this chapter will not be to refute
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Arendt’s conception o f politics as proper to the public realm as a space o f appearances,
but to argue that politics must also comprise processes o f what Rancière refers to as
“dissensus”, which insert new subjects and different objects o f perception into the public
realm, thereby transforming the aesthetic fabric o f the community as such.

\
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Ch. 3: Aesthetic Community and its ‘DissensuaP
Transformation

2.5

I. Introduction
In many ways, Rancière’s intervention into political thought is similar to that of

Arendt. He too is concerned with delimiting the field o f the political, distinguishing it
from ‘society’, government administration, and forms o f power. Politics for Rancière, as
for Arendt, is concerned with what can be seen and heard in common, with modalities of
sensing in common with others. To this end, their respective theoretical enterprises share
in a movement toward the aesthetic in questions o f the political, not because they are
separate domains that need to be brought into relation with one another, but because they
are chiasmatically intertwined. Yet, against A rendf s insistence that politics take place
within the parameters o f a shared aesthetic community, Rancière argues that politics has
no specific place or space, but that it always consists o f the contestation and creation of
such spaces.

Beginning with an analysis of Rancière’s particular aesthetics o f community and
politics, and an exposition o f the many similarities with Arendt’s account, this chapter
argues that Rancière is able (like Arendt) to think politics strictly within the immanence
o f the sensible world, but is able to do so without falling back on a transcendental
conception o f the historical world. To this end, he is able to think the processes of
emancipation, in the form o f ‘dissensus’, which challenges the transcendental coordinates
o f community, a process missing in A rendf s account.
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He is able to do so in part by means an appropriation o f Foucault’s ‘historical a
priori’, as elaborated in the latter’s Archaeology o f Knowledge. The notion o f the
historical a priori allows Rancière to situate the sensus communis within discursive and
normative contexts that, because o f their immanence to the world, are susceptible to
subjective interventions capable o f transforming these contexts.

2.6
2 .6 .1

Rancière and Aesthetic Community
What is Common is Sense:
In many ways, Rancière’s thought marks a decisive break in recent French theory.

A student o f Louis Althusser in the 1960’s, he began his prolific career as a scholar with
a contribution to Althusser’s Reading Capital. Eventually, however, Rancière
increasingly began see Althusser’s distinction between ideology and science-between
those few who possess knowledge and the many who do not-as relying on a
presupposition o f inequality. His break with Althusser spurred a seriek o f writings on the
nature o f equality (in La Leçon d ’A lthusser (1974) and Le maître ignorant (1987) and the
emancipatory interventions o f 19th century workers in France (in La nuit des prolétaires
1989). Although it has not been in as dramatic a fashion, Rancière has also been careful
to distinguish his political thought from that of other great figures in post-war French
thought. He neither contends, as Foucault does, that politics is fundamentally concerned
with relations o f ‘power’ (“Politics is not made up o f power relationships; it is made up
o f relationships between worlds.” D 42), nor has he shown a particular affinity with the
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broadly ethico-religious work o f figures like Jacques Derrida, who focus on the thematics
o f the un(re)presentable Other and the ‘to come’6.

Rancière is perhaps closer to Arendt that any o f these thinkers, to the extent that
he conceives o f politics as coextensive strictly with the fabric o f common experience,
with the realm o f appearance, i.e., with aesthetic community. In a manner similar to
Arendt’s later engagement with Kant’s aesthetics, Rancière argues that the commonality
o f community is sense. “What is common is ‘sensation’. Human beings are tied together
by a certain sensory fabric, a certain distribution o f the sensible, which defines their way
o f being together.”(£ 5 56) His aesthetic o f community centers on a notion that he refers
to as ‘the distribution o f the sensible’ [partage du sensible], and this distribution, like the
dividing lines between private and public in Arendt, partitions political community
according to what is visible and invisible, what is perceived in common with others and
in a common way, and what appears as publically incomprehensible. “The distribution of
the sensible,” he explains, “reveals who can have a share in what is common to the
community based on what they do and on the time and space in which this activity is
performed.. .it defines what is visible or not in a common space, endowed with a
common language etc. There is thus an aesthetics at the core o f politics...” (PA 13)

Beginning with a few isolated references in his La Mésentente (1995), Rancière
has increasingly recognized his indebtedness to Kant’s aesthetics, as well as a growing
interest in it. Indeed, his attempt to articulate the manner in which perception is

6 For Rancière’s commentary on Derrida’s notion of the ‘democracy to-come’ see: “Does Democracy
Mean Something?” in the recently published collection of his essays entitled Dissensus: On Politics and
Aesthetics. Ed. & Trans. Steve Corcoran. London: Continuum, 2010.
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constituted and form ed so that people within a given spatiotemporal situation experience
things in the same way, is couched in the language o f the Kantian transcendental. The
opening lines o f Ranciere’s The Politics o f Aesthetics explain that, in his use o f the term,

aesthetics can be understood in a Kantian sense-re-examined perhaps by
Foucault-as the system of a priori forms determining what presents itself to
sense experience. It is a delimitation of spaces and times, of the visible and the
invisible, of speech and noise, that simultaneously determines the place and
the stakes o f politics as a form of experience. Politics revolves around what is
seen and what can be said of it, around who has the ability to see and the talent
to speak, around properties of space and the possibilities of time.” (PA 13)

I will return later in this chapter to the importance of Foucault and his concept o f the
“historical a priori”, as articulated in the Archaeology o f Knowledge, and the role it plays
in Rancière’s employment o f the term ‘transcendental’. In any case, it is important to
recognize that Rancière’s aesthetic common sense (distribution o f the sensible) can be
understood as an a priori, or transcendental aesthetic, forming our spontaneous
perception o f the world. This, it is worth pointing out, it is not unlike Arendt’s appeal to
the transcendental imagination from the first Critique in her Lectures, which “determines
\

the sensibility a priori,” and “is inherent in all sense perceptions.” (LKP 84)

Michael Shapiro has recently taken note o f Rancière’s debt to Kant, claiming that
his conception o f the “aesthetics at the core o f politics” is, at least in part, rooted in
Kant’s aesthetics. Shapiro points out that “Ranciere's approach to the politics of
aesthetics and his political imaginary have an obvious Kantian heritage.. .Rancière and
Deleuze, among other post Kantians (who in effect accept Kant's displacement of an
ontology o f essence with an ontology o f sense), focus their approaches to ‘the political’
on the ways in which spheres o f experience or sensibility result from an active
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partitioning.” (“AK”, 1) Kant was uniquely able to conceptualize the mediation o f sense
experience, and it is at the level o f this mediation that Rancière’s conception of politics
and community is formed.

Rancière’s ‘distribution o f the sensible’ signifies a common sense, a communal
sense that shares much with Arendt’s appropriation o f the sensus communis. “A
‘common sense’ is, in the first instance, a community o f sensible data: things whose
visibility is supposed to be shareable by all, modes o f perception o f these things, and the
equally shareable meanings that are conferred on them.” (ES 102) He has even begun, in
recent years, to call the ‘distribution o f the sensible’ as an ‘aesthetic community’ with a
particular ‘sensus communis “An aesthetic community,” he argues in the Emancipated
Spectator (2009), “is not a community o f aesthetes. It is a community o f sense, or a
sensus communis.” (ES 57) Katherine Wolfe, in her essay “From Aesthetics to Politics:
Kant, Rancière, Deleuze” remarks with regard to the commonality at the heart of
Rancièrian community that “this commonality is no shared stock o f goods or shared
claim to a territory. Rather, it is a shared partition o f the sensible: coihmunity pivots
around common modalities o f sense. In other words, the commonality upon which a
community is founded is sense, and politics first becomes a possibility with the institution
o f common sense.” (Wolfe, 2006)

Like Arendt’s historicist appropriation o f Kant’s sensus communis, Rancière’s is
unequivocally contingent, local, and immanent to the forms o f expression and associative
frameworks o f a particular space and time; it is “a spatiotemporal system in which words
and visible forms are assembled into shared data, shared ways o f perceiving, being
affected, and imparting meaning.” (ES 57) Common sense, for Rancière as for Arendt, is
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most certainly not a universal structure o f an ahistorical mind. And yet, as I shall try to
show, Rancière’s historicisation has a second moment, one that I argue is not present in
Arendt. While he insists that common sense and aesthetico-politico community is always
historically embedded, he does not proceed, as Arendt does, to elevate this historical
world to quasi-sacredness, whose continuation and permanence should form the horizon
o f political action. Having recognized that it is conditioned by particular historical
milieus, he proceeds to “de-historicize” (PA 50) common sense, to show that gaps,
intervals, and interruptions which re-configure the sensible world, structured by inherited
wisdom, can be instituted by political subjects who decisively break with historical
determinations o f their condition. As I will argue in more detail in the final section o f this
chapter, this de-historicization allows Rancière to conceptualize acts o f dissensus that
reconfigure the line between what is perceived as public and what as private, which is
always a line separating the visible and the audible from the invisible and the inaudible.

2 .6 .2

C om m on Sense as Police Order:
\

De-historicization is part and parcel o f a concern that Rancière demonstrates
toward the constitutively exclusive structure o f aesthetico-political community, a concern
that is not as salient in Arendt’s work. If aesthetic community, as Arendt showed in her
Lectures K ant’s Political Philosophy, allows certain subjects and objects to appear in
public space in a common way for a group o f people, then it necessarily renders other
subjects and other objects imperceptible, or at the very least unperceived.

At the same time as the distribution o f the sensible makes possible a common
world, it also takes on a function that Rancière calls the ‘police’, which regulates the
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possible participants and the modes o f participation in this common world by partitioning
who and what can be seen therein. The police is “a generally implicit law that defines
forms o f partaking by first defining the modes o f perception o f the world (de monde) and
o f people (du monde), upon which the nomoi o f the community are founded. This
partition should be understood in the double sense o f the word: on the one hand, as that
which separates and excludes; on the other, as that which allows participation.” (“TTP”
36) Participation in common life (Arendt’s public realm), Rancière reveals, is only
possible because o f a normative distribution or allotment (neme 'in) that precludes the
partaking o f certain parts o f the common. It relies on a “count” o f the “parts” (DA 6) o f
the community that divides (partage) this community from any heterogeneous parts that
would threaten its unity, disavowing what Rancière refers to as its “fundamental
miscounts (mécomptes)”. (DA 10)

While the temptation is to relate Rancière’s concept o f the police to his early
mentor Althusser’s account o f the policeman who performs the function of interpellation,
this is not what Rancière has in mind. The police, in his view, “is that which says that
here, on this street, there’s nothing to see and so nothing to do but move along.” (“TTP”
37) It performs a function o f directing perception at certain objects and not others; of
seeing this object as a matter o f public concern and another as merely private; of
enforcing this understanding o f a given phenomenon and not another. In some ways,
however, the notion o f the police is reminiscent o f classical Marxist ideology in that it
reinforces the sedimentation and naturalization of the existing ways o f seeing that
constitute the common world, turning them into “self-evident facts o f sense perception”
(PA 13). In doing so, it bolsters the permanence the given world. There is thus a
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conservative force at the heart o f common sense, which, while characteristic o f Arendtian
common sense, is not adequately problematized by her.

This added, conservative dimension that Rancière emphasizes in the notion of
aesthetic community and the sensus communis allows us to point to the difference
between the manner in which both Arendt and Rancière place the aesthetic at the core of
politics. Arendt is not particularly concerned with the role o f the sensus communis in
closing off the common world from those who are unequal within it, by devolving into a
saturated consensus. Rather, she is more interested in what it opens up; in how it makes
possible the unfolding o f action, speech, and judgment in a common world. Rancière,
however, is more attuned to this role, and he proceeds, on the basis o f this insight, to
argue that politics must also involve those processes that upset the communal sense, that
open it onto that which the existing configuration o f shared perception renders invisible
and inaudible: inequality. His name for such processes is precisely politics, which
“consists in making what was unseen visible; in making what was audible as mere noise
heard as speech...” (“TTP” 38) To the extent that Arendt does not make room in her
conception o f aesthetico-political community and the public realm for the intervention of
excluded subjects who could, at least in principle, challenge the aesthetic framework of
the community that relegates them to the mute darkness o f the ‘private’ or ‘social’
realms, her political thought at times risks collapsing politics into the police.

Politics or the Police?: D efining Disagreement: Ranctere’s distinction between politics
and the police is upheld by a conception o f the aesthetics o f politics that is twofold.
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Whereas Arendt only focuses on the aesthetic constitution and persistence of community,
Rancière divides his aesthetic conception o f politics into consensus and dissensus. There
is, on the one hand, the a priori forms o f experience-the common sense that supports
inter-subjective life in the forms o f interlocution and public action-which he
distinguishes sharply from an aesthetics o f rupture, intervention, and reconfiguration. The
former aesthetic function he calls consensus, the latter he names dissensus.

This distinction, then, begs the question as to whether or not Arendt’s public
realm is in fact a space o f consensus? Answering this question will enable us to better
discern whether Arendt collapses politics into the police, that is, into the preservation o f
the existing perceptual parameters o f community. But the answer to this question also
depends on how this term is defined. Rancière has not simply adopted the quotidian
meaning o f consensus, and it is important to clarify the manner in which he distinguishes
his own deployment o f this term from our general understanding o f it.

To begin with, “consensus does not merely mean an agreement between persons
or groups. This agreement presupposes a specific distribution o f the visible, the sayable,
and the thinkable. Consensus frames a reality that is supposed to be one and the same for
everybody. Consensus says that we may have conflicting interests, aspirations, and
values, but that we are obliged, nonetheless, to agree that the given is given.” (Rancière,
“WMI”, 2008) Typically, consensus is conceived o f as a posterori, as an agreement
arrived at after dialogue and debate. But Rancière’s unique deployment o f the term
consensus treats it as a priori. Any given dialogue, debate or exchange o f ideas, to the
extent that it is possible in the first place, presupposes a consensus about what makes
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sense and what does not, what is given and compels us to agree on the self-evidence of
the given in spite o f any differences o f opinion we may have.

While it is true that Arendt conceives the public realm as one that is characterized
by conflict, disagreement, and perspectival plurality, these conflicts, disagreements, and
perspectives are encompassed in an a priori consensus on what can be seen, heard, and
spoken about. This is evident throughout The Human Condition, where Arendt claims
that “Only where things can be seen by many in a variety o f aspects without changing
their identity, so that those who are gathered around them know they see sameness in
utter diversity, can worldly reality truly and reliably appear.” [italics added] (HC 57) She
reiterates a similar point in her Lectures, stating that “all single agreements or
disagreements presuppose that we are talking about the same thing-that we, who are
many, agree, come together, on something that is one and the same for all o f us.” (LKP
83) In that any potential dispute or debate in the public realm is mediated through a web
o f the categories and examples that are in themselves not disputed but simply given,
Arendt’s public realm forecloses the occurrence o f more radical disagreements.

One o f the problems with Arendt’s conception o f the public realm is that any
challenge to the identity o f the objects o f public concern, a radical dis-agreement about
their signification and significance, indeed, their very existence, can only ever amount to
the destruction and the termination o f politics. The problem is that, in the public realm,
“differences o f position and the resulting variety o f perspectives notwithstanding,
everybody is always concerned with the same object. If the sameness o f the object can no
longer be discerned, no common nature o f m en... can prevent the destruction o f the
common world.” (HC 58) For Rancière, conversely such disputes are the very essence of

43

politics, and, far from simply destroying the common world, they reconstitute it along
different sensory lines.

So what Rancière calls consensus is precisely the preservation o f the objective
givens o f the common world, the attempt to circumscribe disagreements within a ‘world’
whose ‘reality’ or ‘givenness’ is beyond dispute. A truly political disagreement, what he
calls a mésentente, is a placing in question, and thus a challenge, o f the very framework
that makes individual agreements and disagreements, particular judgments and opinions
possible in the first place; “it is less concerned with arguing than with what can be
argued, the presence or absence o f a common object between X and Y.” (DA xii)
Disagreement occurs “when the interlocutors both understand and do not understand the
same things by the same words.” (DA xi) The interlocutors lack a common ground of
sense to appeal to, producing a conflict between two sensible worlds, that according to
Rancière calls the ‘givenness’ o f the objective world into question: “La mésentente est
précisément ce fa it que les données memes ne sont pas univoques, objectives, qu ’il y a
donc contestation non pas simplement des idées, des droits ou des revendications mais
des données du problème.” (“XP” 194)

To the extent that such disagreements are not a part o f her conception of politics,
Rancière accuses Arendt o f participating in one of the three anti-political logics of the
Occidental tradition, namely, ‘parapolitics’. Whereas the two other logics, archipolitics
and metapolitics, aim at the elimination o f politics altogether-the latter by means o f the
harmonious fulfillment o f the essential principle or arché of the community (Plato), and
the former by collapsing politics into the infrastructural dynamics o f the social (M arx)parapolitics seeks to contain politics within acceptable parameters. As James Ingram
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explains, “Parapolitics does not, like archi- or metapolitics, try to abolish politics
altogether. Instead, it seeks to limit politics, admitting it only in homeopathic doses,
containing its spontaneity, uncertainty, and contingency by limiting it to certain actors at
certain times and places.” (Ingram, 2009) Although Aristotle is the forerunner o f this
logic, Rancière identifies Arendt as its contemporary exemplar.

This reading o f Arendt’s politics as parapolitics is substantiated by the rigidity of
the boundaries that she establishes, particularly in The Human Condition, between the
distinct spheres o f human activity, i.e., the public and the private, the political and the
social. In Arendt’s account o f the Periclean polis, she describes the law that divided the
public from the private realm as “quite literally a wall, without which there might have
been an agglomeration o f houses, a town (asty), but not a city, a political community.
This wall-like law was sacred, but only the inclosure was political.” {HC 64) Within this
‘inclosure’, in which place alone politics, as intersubjectively validated appearances, is
possible, the political ideals o f equality and freedom are realized, while outside inequality
and servitude prevail. “The polis," explains Arendt, “was distinguished from the
household in that it knew only ‘equals' ... To be sure, this equality o f the political realm
has very little in common with our concept o f equality; it meant to live among and to
have to deal only with one’s peers. And it presupposed the existence o f ‘unequals’ who,
as a matter o f fact, were always the majority o f the population in a city-state.” {HC 32) It
is exactly this ‘polis,’ however, that becomes the ‘police’ in Rancière’s thought: “The
police is, essentially, the law, generally implicit, that defines a party’s share or lack o f it.”
{DA 29) The ‘police law’ is the force that divides private from public, and that seeks to
preserve this division by rendering its contestation or dispute quite literally senseless. “It
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is police law, for example, that traditionally turns the workplace into a private space not
regulated by the ways o f seeing and saying proper to what is called the public domain,
where the worker’s having a part is strictly defined by the remuneration o f his work.”
{DA 29)

This rigorous division o f spheres is intimately connected with the difficulty
Arendt has in theorizing the insertion o f marginalized and oppressed peoples into the
community o f equals that is the public realm. As Ingram points out, “Arendt follows
Aristotle and the whole tradition o f political philosophy in restricting politics to an elite.
She is open about this: participation in public affairs, whether in the Greek polis or the
Roman republic, was always based on the exclusion o f women, slaves, workers,
foreigners, etc. If politics for her is participation in the common, only some participate.”
(SPR 238) While Arendt argues that the political realm is one o f equality and freedom,
this equality and freedom is reserved for those who are already participants in it. The
process o f becoming equal or becoming free is prevented by the purity o f the public
realm, and this is exactly how the logic o f parapolitics functions.

'

By confining political interlocution to the normative strictures o f common sense,
to judgments that draw on the examples and concepts o f inherited wisdom that inhere in
and determine what and who can appear in the public realm, Arendt renders the attempts
by excluded peoples to articulate themselves into the public realm, to politicize their
inequality, senseless in advance, leaving only the possibility o f mere noise. In this way
Arendt reinscribes, at the heart o f politics a distinction, originally made by Aristotle in his
description o f slaves and women, between beings who possess phone and those that
possess logos. The voices o f those on whom the light o f the public realm does not shine
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are reduced to outbursts o f sound which announce pain and suffering, but not reasoned
arguments on justice, or any matter o f ‘public’ concern. This “is not to say that their
voices simply do not register audibly but that they register only in an unrecognizable
modality.” (Wolfe, “FPA”, 1)

In any case, if these figures are to assume a place in public affairs, if it is
conceivable for them to make an appearance and to communicate in the light o f the polis,
the transition from a being (perceived as) possessing phoné to one (perceived as)
possessing logos, that is, from a part o f the those without part to a constituted actor and
speaker, must be thinkable. Such transitions require a recasting o f the sensible and the
transformation o f common sense, and it is precisely this transition that Rancière’s
conception o f politics as a process o f ‘dissensus’ is concerned with.

2.7

Rancière and the Politics o f Dissensus
\

Rancière’s conception o f politics is not reducible to the moments o f disagreement
(imésentente) that I discussed above. In order for such disagreements to become
adequately political, they must be developed into a process o f ‘dissensus’. Although I
have introduced this term in several places throughout this chapter, it is necessary to
examine it in greater detail. Dissensus “is not a designation o f conflict as such, but is a
specific type thereof.” (“PPA” 139) If consensus consists in an “agreement between sense
and sense, in other words between a mode o f sensory presentation and a regime of
meaning, (“PPA” 145) then dissensus marks “a conflict between sense and sense,”
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(“PPA” 139) between what is perceived and the meanings imparted on it. Under the title
o f dissensus, Rancière articulates a concept of emancipation that points to the possibility
o f rendering mobile the borders that separate the private realm from the public realm, the
political from the social, by challenging the order o f (common) sense that underwrites
them. To this end, I agree with James Ingram’s claim that Rancière does not have to be
read simply as opposing Arendt’s political theory-though at times it is clear that he
believes him self to be doing so-but rather as ‘emending’ or ‘radicalizing’ it. (Ingram,
“SPR” 237) ‘Dissensus’, ‘emancipation’, and ‘subjectivization’ can be understood as
providing the resources to render Arendt’s account o f politics less stringent and more
egalitarian by politicizing those “unequals” on whom the illumination o f the public
sphere does not fall, without compromising the integrity o f her distinctions.

7

Central to the manner in which Rancière conceives dissensus, is his claim that
“the specificity o f political dissensus is that its partners are no more constituted than is
the object or stage o f discussion itself.” (“TTP” 38) Dissensus, far from comprising an act
or actions by publically recognizable subjects in a pre-constituted public space, is the
about the presentation o f new subjects and the construction o f such spaces. “Dissensus,”
explains Davide Panagia, “refers to the emergence o f a heterology extraneous to a
common world o f perceiving,” (PLS 42) by which he means the appearance o f what had
previously eluded or was excluded in the established realm o f appearance. This is why
Rancière calls dissensus a process o f subjectification. In this process o f subjectification,

*7

Rancière does not, in principle, reject Arendt’s distinctions between public and private. While he certainly
does not endorse them, he appears throughout his work to be interested, not in refuting or replacing them,
but in showing how the lines or partition that define them might be traversed, opened, and reconfigured.
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those who are invisible and inaudible within the distribution o f the sensible (‘the part of
those who have no part’) creatively manifest themselves as equal members of the
community o f speaking and thinking beings, constituting themselves as actors who did
not previously exist. In this respect, subjectivization is not unlike the Arendtian notion of
natality, albeit it a radicalization of it that seeks to account for the insertion o f unequals
into the sphere o f equality viz. the public realm.

Throughout his work, Rancière frequently makes reference to the example of the
Roman plebeians on the Aventine, who were both materially and symbolically excluded
from the Roman social order, who attempted to resist patrician domination, not by means
o f physical violence or revolt, but by the staging o f their capacity to speak. Concerning
their deplorable condition, Rancière asks:

Faced with this, what do the plebs gathered on the Aventine do? They do not
set up a fortified camp in the manner of the Scythian slaves, They do what
would have been unthinkable to the latter: they establish another order, another
partition o f the perceptible, by constituting themselves not as warriors equal to
other warriors but as speaking beings sharing the same properties as those who
deny them these. They thereby execute a series of speech acts that mimic those
of the patricians: they pronounce imprecations and apotheoses; they delegate
one of their number to go and consult their oracles; they give themselves
representatives by rebaptizing them... Through transgression, they find that
they too, just like speaking beings, are endowed with speech that does not
simply express want, suffering, or rage, but intelligence. They write... a place
in the symbolic order of the community of speaking beings...” (DA 24-25)

Dissensual subjectification is the very process o f becoming-subject, o f making a subject
heard and seen before the ears and eyes o f the existing sensus communis by
demonstrating that they are more than beings of phone, that they are capable of those
words and deeds that compose the public realm from which they are shunned. In this way
“the plebians have actually violated the order o f the city”. (DA 25) Rather than remaining
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anonymous and nameless, “they have given themselves names.” {DA 25) Rather than
resisting by physical force accompanied by moans o f hunger and rage, confirming that
they are nothing but mute bodies, they “carried out a series o f speech acts linking the life
o f their bodies to words and word use.” {DA 25) Such acts can never, for Rancière, be
simply accommodated by the existing space o f politics, but requires the politicization of
those beings that have been relegated to a position outside o f the political.

Thus, although subjectification is central to it, dissensus is not solely about
subjects. It concerns the whole dispositif o f a priori forms o f experience that “determine
what presents itself to sense experience” {PA 13), and in what way. It is as much about
introducing foreign objects as it is about constituting foreign subjects, about making new
and illicit connections between words and things, subjects and places, activities and the
times in which they unfold.

The notion of dissensus thus means the following: politics is comprised of a
surplus of subjects that introduce, within the saturated order of the police, a
surplus o f objects. These subjects do not have the consistency of coherent
social groups united by common property or a common birth, etc. They exist
entirely within the act, and their actions are the manifestation of a dissensus;
that is, the making contentious o f the givens o f a particular situation. The
subjects of politics make visible that which is not perceivable, that which,
under the optics of a given perceptive field, did not possess a raison d'etre, that
which did not have a name, [italics added] (“Dissenting Words”)

It is an entire recasting o f the givens sensible experience, o f the sensus communis as the
aesthetic fabric o f the common, that is ultimately at stake in dissensus. This recasting
involves the association o f subjects and objects that, under the conditions o f the police
distribution o f the sensible, normally occupy heterogeneous fields o f experience, such as
that o f the private world and that o f the public. Redrawing the boundaries between public
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and private, dissensus “asks if labor or maternity, for example, is a private or a social
matter, if this social function is a public function or not.” (DA 40)

g

In his essay “The Use o f Distinctions”, Rancière states: “I take as my explicit
target Arendt’s notion o f ‘political life’.. .1 object that it is precisely an anti-political
logic, the logic o f the police, that marks off a specific realm for political acts in this
w ay... As I understand it, politics is, on the contrary, an activity that retraces the line, that
introduces cases o f universality and the capacities for the formulation o f the common,
into a universe that was considered private, domestic, or social.” (“UD” 206-207)

The consequences for a rethinking o f Arendtian politics are manifest here. In
response to Badiou’s critique o f Arendt’s politics o f judgment, which by indexing all
speech and action to the coordinates o f the public realm forecloses the possibility o f
radically ‘modifying’ this realm, Rancière’s concept o f dissensual subjectification
accounts for the politicization o f words and deeds that do not conform to these
coordinates. In Arendt’s public realm, where “communicability” is the “touchstone”
(LKP 73) o f their political worth, such words and deeds risk being dismissed or going
unnoticed because they do not conform to the shared imaginary that makes some things
communicable and others not. In this way, Rancière does not subordinate heterogeneity8

8 In her seminal The Second Sex, Simone de Beauvoir demonstrated that what sustained the oppression of
women was not simply that they were perceived as inferior, but rather the notion that they were destined for
private life, and lacked that capacity for thought and speech on issues of universal or public significance.
Women’s emancipation, she argued, meant precisely the ‘transcendence’ of the private world into the
public, claiming the capacity to speak and act - in short, to appear - on issues of universal importance. See
“Introduction” to The Second Sex.
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and difference to the sameness and persisting identity o f the given world, “but rather is
‘the production, within a determined, sensible world, o f a given that is heterogeneous to
it’.” (PLS 42) As Rancière explains in the Emancipated Spectator, “Dissensus brings
back into play both the obviousness o f what can be perceived, thought and done, and the
distribution o f those who are capable o f perceiving, thinking and altering the coordinates
o f the shared world. This is what a process o f political subjectivation consists in: in the
action o f uncounted capacities that crack open the unity o f the given and the obviousness
o f the visible, in order to sketch a new topography o f the possible.” (ES 49)

2.7.1

The Debate Over Human Rights

Rancière’s insistence that politics does not, in the first instance, concern the inner
workings and happenings o f the public realm, but in the way that this realm and its
dispositif o f appearance is reconfigured, is most salient in his 2006 essay “Who is the
Subject o f the Rights o f Man?”. Here, he takes issue with A rendf s analysis o f stateless
and rightless people, whom he sees as condemned to a ‘bare life’ without hope of
emancipation.

While it is certainly legible throughout the entirety o f Arendt’s oeuvre, the
radically o f her distinction between those inside political community and those without
is perhaps most salient in her critique o f notion o f the ‘Rights o f Man and o f the Citizen’
in her early Origins o f Totalitarianism. Based on her experience as one o f the mass of
stateless people that resulted from the Second World War, Arendt famously claims that
there is no such thing as the rights o f man qua man-, only citizens have rights, which
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produces the tautological conclusion that only those who have rights have rights, namely,
citizens. As Arendt explains, during the Second World War,

...the concept o f human rights, based upon the assumed existence o f a human
being as such, broke down at the very moment when those who professed to
believe in it were for the first time confronted with people who had indeed lost
all other qualities and specific relationships - except that they were still
human. The world found nothing sacred in the abstract nakedness of being
human. (OT 299)

The condition o f those who are stateless-those who, as Arendt describes, have been
deprived o f polity-is one o f bare life. Aside from the obvious material deprivation
(poverty, poor working conditions, no access to social benefits etc.) implied by such a
condition, what is truly privative about the absence o f citizenship and polity is the
impossibility o f appearing, in the distinct Arendtian sense comprising action, speech and
judgment:

\

...the fundamental deprivation of human rights is manifested first and above
all in the deprivation of a place in the world in which opinions are significant
and actions effective... This extremity, and nothing else, is the situation of
people deprived of human rights. They are deprived, not of the right to
freedom, but of the right to action; not of the right to think whatever they
please, but of the right to opinion. (OT 296)

Arendt refers to those deprived o f the capacity for opinion, and action, o f judgment and
speech, as “beyond oppressed.” “Slavery’s fundamental offence against human rights,”
she argues, “was not that it took liberty aw ay... but that it excluded a certain category o f
people even o f the possibility o f fighting for freedom.” (OT 297)
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Rancière takes issue with this characterization, and sees it as symptomatic of the
public/private distinction at the heart o f Arendt’s thought. “The notion of a ‘state beyond
oppression’,” he argues, “relates less to reality and more to Arendt’s rigid opposition
between the realm o f the political and the realm o f private life-what in the same chapter
she calls ‘the dark background o f mere givenness’.” (WSR 61) What the positing o f this
state does to the expropriated and dispossesed, Rancière continues, is “enable a way of
placing them in sphere o f exceptionality that was no longer political but o f an
anthropological sacredness situated beyond political dissensus.” (WSR 64) In this way,
according to Rancière, the attempt to preserve distinct spheres o f human activity “de
populates the political stage by sweeping aside its always ambiguous actors,” (WSR 67)
viz. those actors who dot belong to the public sphere but who are attempting to stage their
appearance there.

Rancière’s point is that human rights cannot be understood as a determinate
property o f subjects without falling into an ‘anthropological sacredness’ that prevents the
opening o f ‘intervals’ or ‘passages’ from bare life to a constituted political actor, with the
attendant rights and capacities. For Rancière, conversely, “The Rights o f Man are the
rights o f those who make something o f that inscription.” (WSR 68) If, in his view, these
rights are taken as polemical, as perpetually subject to dispute as to who possesses them
and who does not, then the problem Arendt runs into can be circumvented. “The
Declaration o f Rights states that all men are bom free and equal, and thus raises a
question about the sphere o f implementation o f these predicates. Answering, like Arendt,
that this sphere is that o f citizenship, o f a political life separated from that o f private life,
resolves the problem in advance. For the issue is to know precisely where to draw the line
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separating one life from the other. Politics concerns that border, an activity that
constantly places it in question.” (WSR 68)

Andrew Schapp’s recent essay “Enacting the Right to Have Rights: Jacques
Rancière’s Critique o f Hannah Arendt”, sheds light on the difference between the
approaches o f Arendt and Rancière to the question o f human rights. Although Arendt
does defend stateless peoples by claiming that they have ‘the right to have rights’, he
argues in this paper that her conception o f politics does not have the resources to account
for how such rights might be enacted, and that a turn to Rancière can ultimately provide
such an account For Arendt, he argues, “outwith the polity, the subject o f human rights
is, by definition, without politics. Deprived o f the rights o f citizenship, she has no means
o f redress, no basis on which she might claim ‘the right to have rights’. For Rancière,
however, the aporia o f human rights that Arendt diagnoses is more a product o f the
ontological presuppositions on which her analysis relies than it is a defining aspect of
statelessness. (ER 2)
\

Shapp points to the political movement o f the sans papiers in France (immigrant
workers without citizenship and rights) to exemplify Rancière’s polemical conception of
the Rights o f Man. It is their very inequality, their very lack o f citizenship, that they turn
into a decisively political issue: “The sans papiers enact the right to have rights when
they speak as i f they had the same rights as the French nationals they address. They
occupy a church to draw attention to their economic participation within French society
rather than remaining unseen and unheard on threat o f deportation. Instead o f hiding from
the police they turn up to police head quarters and say ‘we are the sans papiers o f SaintBemard and we have business in this building’.” (Schapp, 2010) This is precisely what
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political subjedification, as constitutive o f dissensus, aims at: the sensible presentation of
a dispute, which renders perceptible what was invisible and audible the pronouncements
o f those previously mute.

2 .7 .2

Is Emancipation Political or Social?

Ranciere’s assertion that Arendt’s conception o f politics as proper to a rigidly
defined sphere tends to depoliticize the emancipation o f those not admitted into it, I
would argue, is corroborated by her characterization o f poverty and the historical
struggles for liberation from it. In The Human Condition, Arendt draws attention to what
she perceives as “[t]he danger that the modem age’s emancipation o f labor will not only
fail to usher in an age o f freedom for all but will result, on the contrary, in forcing all
mankind for the first time under the yoke o f necessity...” (HC 130) Because poverty,
“which puts men under the absolute dictate o f their bodies,” (OR 60>,is by definition
opposed to that free activity o f speaking and acting that is the essence o f Arendtian
politics, Arendt suggests that the politicization o f poverty could mark the ruin o f politics
altogether. The political, she maintains, is strictly divorced from problems pertaining to
human necessity: “freedom is exclusively located in the political realm...[and] necessity
is primarily a prepolitical phenomenon.” (HC 31) With regard to the labour movements
o f the Nineteenth and Twentieth centuries, she therefore claims, “the point is not that for
the first time in history laborers were admitted and given equal rights in the public realm,
but that we have almost succeeded in leveling all human activities to the common
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denominator o f securing the necessities o f life and providing for their abundance.” (HC
126) It is thus not surprising that in her On Revolution (1963), Arendt is weary of
attempts to make out o f the problem o f poverty-what she refers to as the ‘social
question’-th e orientation o f political praxis. To this end, she faults Marx with the
“transformation o f the social question into a political force.” (OR 62)

If what Rancière theorizes under the title o f emancipation (dissensus,
subj edification) were reducible to social movements and the alleviation of poverty, we
might see this as a mere deviation from Arendt’s account o f politics. But emancipation,
In Rancière’s use o f the term, is not about social identities or material necessity. “La
mésentente tient au fait que les sujets de la politique ne sont pas des parties d ’un group
social. Elle tient au fond au partage initial entre police et politique, à la position même
d ’un part des sans-part.” (“Xénophobie et Politique” 194) Dissensus is instituted by the
part o f those who have no part, who are not defined by their particular identity
characteristics, but by the way they negatively interrupt the distribution o f identities and
the sensible order that supports them. “Politics exists insofar as the people is not
identified with a race or a population, nor the poor with a particular disadvantaged sector,
nor the proletariat with a group o f industrial workers, etc., but insofar as these latter are
identified with subjects that inscribe, in the form o f a supplement to every count o f the
parts o f the society, a specific figure o f the count o f the uncounted or the part of those
without part.” (“TTP” 35) Identities are enforced by consensus qua police order. If
dissensus were simply about the adjustment o f the existing distribution o f goods to their
own benefit, this would not be a challenge to consensus, but merely an attempt to become
greater beneficiaries within the existing order, without radically challenging it.

57

Dissensus, then, is not about the particular demands-for fairer treatment, equal
pay, suffrage etc.-that political subjects may make at a given time. Certainly, it does not
exclude such demands, but what it aims at, beyond them, is the construction o f a subject
who could assume the position as an interlocutor in discussions o f the issues they raise.
Dissensus is at once singular, local, and subjective, yet by virtue o f the fact that it brings
to light the logic and the contradictions o f the world to which it is addressed, it has
universal, public significance. To challenge the condition o f sans-part is, by its very
nature, to place in question the entire order that makes such a condition possible.

2.8 Rancière’s ‘Immanent Transcendental’ and its Dissensual
Transformation

If Arendt’s failure to provide a satisfying account o f the political (rather than the
merely social) import o f emancipatory politics is, as I have been suggesting, symptomatic
o f the particular manner that she conceives aesthetic community, then I argue that
Rancière’s ability to provide such an account is equally a result o f the way he conceives
aesthetic community. I would therefore like to return to this account, which I outlined at
the beginning o f this chapter, in order to better shed light on the consequences for politics
inherent in the different ways that Arendt and Rancière understand the relation between
aesthetic and political community.

In order to understand why Rancière argues that the kind o f shifts effected by
dissensus are possible, and to substantiate his account o f how these shifts take place, it is

58

necessary to delve deeper into his notion o f aesthetics as the a priori constitution of our
collective forms o f experience, and how his declared Foucauldian reading o f Kant
informs this notion. Although little has been said in the scholarship on Rancière about
this connection, I argue that it is integral to the way he is able to justify his notion o f the
sensus communis as a sensory fabric o f community that can be transformed in moments
o f political intervention.

What prevents this transformation in Arendt’s political thought, I maintained in
the previous chapter, is that she elevates aesthetic conditions o f community qua inherited
wisdom and social imaginary to a quasi-sacred status. In doing so, she compromised the
immanence o f the sensus communis, its radical susceptibility to rupture and
reconfiguration. I argue that Rancière’s ability to think the contestation o f the aesthetic
paramaters o f community, i.e., its operative consensus or sensus communis, is rooted in
his uniquely immanent transcendental aesthetic. This notion o f the transcendental
supports his account o f dissensus as making illicit connections between words and things,
activities and the spaces they occupy or ought to occupy.

In an often overlooked part o f the interview with Gabriel Rockhill included in the
English edition o f The Politics o f Aesthetics, Rancière addresses the problem of the
transcendental directly. “As for the transcendental,” he explains there, “it is necessary to
see what this word can mean. The transcendental.. .can either bring the transcendent back
into the immanent or, on the contrary, make it take flight once again into the
transcendent.” (PA 50) Kant’s transcendental, which conditions a field o f experience but
is itself rooted in a subject that remains independent from it, constitutes what could be
called a transcendent-transcendental. Because the forms o f intuition and the categories of
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cognition organize the space, time, and logic o f empirical experience, but are nonetheless
spatiotemporally invariant, Kant’s “takes flight” into the transcendent. The a priori
conditioning o f (collective) experience theorized by both Arendt and Rancière, however,
is situated squarely within the immanence of the world. By bringing the forms of
common experience into the temporal and spatial situatedness o f the historical world,
they bring the transcendent (transcendental) back into the immanent.

Rancière’s unique attempt to conceive o f the sertsus communis as historically
contingent differs from Arendt’s, however, in that it takes immanence o f the
transcendental to its furthest conclusion, theorizing those dissensual interventions that
themselves act in a radically transformative way on these historically determined fields.
At work in this conception, he reveals, is an awareness o f Foucault’s archaeological
project, which sought to rethink the relationship between the transcendental and the
historical. In particular, it is the notion o f the ‘historical a priori’-alluded to in Rancière’s
claim that he conceives o f aesthetics as a priori after Foucault-that seeks to explain how
the a priori conditions o f experience are constituted, not in the mind o f a constituent
subject, but in the discursive configuration o f given historical moment.

Foucault conceived his ‘historical a priori’ as the particular configuration of
‘knowledge’ that enables the connection of statements, constitutes the visibility o f certain
objects, and regulates how they are seen, judged, and spoken about. But knowledge, here,
does not simply mean scientific knowledge, and as Gilles Deleuze explains in his book
Foucault, knowledge “cannot be separated from the various thresholds in which it is
caught up including even the experience o f perception, the values o f the imagination, the
prevailing ideas or commonly held beliefs.” (F 51) While it is not within the scope of our
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inquiry to provide an exhaustive account o f Foucault’s Archaeology o f Knowledge, what
is significant here is the manner in which Foucault tries to render these a priori,
transcendental configurations o f knowledge immanent to the very things they configure.
Unlike the universal conception o f ‘mind’ constitutive o f the Kantian a priori, “this a
priori does not elude historicity: it does not constitute, above events, and in an unmoving
heaven, an atemporal structure; it is defined as the group o f rules that characterize a
discursive practice; but these rules are not imposed from the outside on the elements they
connect; they are caught up in the very things they connect.” (Foucault, A K 144) In
Foucault’s archaeological work, Kevin Robinson points out, these transcendental
“conditions are not ahistorical and universal rules that determine in advance what could
be given or said but are rather the historically changing rules o f what is actually given
and said. And these rules are themselves a 'transformable group’ since they do not sit
above events like an ‘atemporal structure’ in some unmoveable heaven’ but are caught up
‘in the very things they connect’.” (Robinson, “IT” 2007)

Returning to Rockhill’s interview, it is clear that Rancière’s conception of the
transcendental aesthetic o f community-.yera'w.s' communis-is closely related to Foucault’s
immanent transcendental. I quote: “I would say that my approach is a bit similar to
Foucault’s. It retains the principle o f the Kantian transcendental that replaces the
dogmatism o f truth with the search for conditions o f possibility. At the same time, these
are not conditions for thought in general, but rather conditions immanent in a particular
system o f thought, a particular system o f expression, [italics added] (PA 50) But I would
also argue that Rancière takes Foucault’s insight to its logical conclusion, one that
Foucault did not draw in his own work. “I differ from Foucault insofar as his archaeology
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seems to me to follow a schema o f historical necessity according to which, beyond a
certain chasm, something is no longer thinkable, can no longer be formulated... I thus try
at one and the same to historicize the transcendental and de-historicize these systems o f
conditions o f possibility" [italics added] (PA 50)

While Arendt did historicize the transcendental-demonstrating that the
conditioning o f the common sensible world is wrapped up with historical examples,
narratives, and forms o f expression-she failed to de-historicize this common sense, that
is, to integrate into her conception o f the political those mechanisms that radically
challenge the historically contingent sensus communis. Arendt is certainly right to argue
that the exemplary ‘schemas’ that organize our common perception (sensus communis) o f
subjects and objects in the world are rooted in the historical milieus we inhabit. These
perceptual organizations, for example, ensure that a ‘worker’ appears as a man who
humbly labours; a ‘woman’ as one who occupies a domestic space and goes about her
business; a young Arab inhabitant o f the banlieue as one who appears as delinquent; in
short, their very mode o f appearance-whether as public or private, political or social-will
be determined in advance by these ‘schemas’ o f imagination, politics must consist of
those processes o f introducing different schemas o f ‘worker’ and ‘women’, ‘Arab’ and
‘delinquent’. Different schemas mean different perceptions, new ways o f imparting
meaning on the common world, in short, a new field o f imagined possibilities.

In Dis-agreement, Rancière proposes something o f this sort. He describes
dissensus as “an operator that connects and disconnects different areas, regions,
identities, functions, and capacities existing in the configuration o f a given experience.”
(DA 40) Rancière’s notion o f dissensus reveals that a politics o f aesthetics treats the
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aesthetic organization o f community-the sensus communis-as immanent to the ways
speaking and perceiving that inhere in it, and by doing so avoids elevating them to a
world-historical transcendence. Because they are ‘transformable’, politics ought not to
restrict itself to that which happens within and according to the ‘world as it is’, but ought
also be concerned with contesting, over-writing, and recasting it. “If,” for Rancière,
“there is such a thing as an ‘aesthetics o f politics’, it lies in a re-configuration o f the
common experience o f the sensible.” (“PPA” 140)

This is what Rancière accomplishes with his notion o f dissensus. Dissensus
provokes illicit associations between words and things (for example ‘migrants’, and the
rights o f citizens), bodies and the spaces they can occupy (for example, women and the
public space o f appearances), and in doing so frames a different common sense. And if “a
common sense can be described as a form o f being together relying on a certain
community between things and words,” then dissensus changes our very modes of being
together, our modes o f sensing-with ([inter-est). (“PPA” 141)
\

The criteria o f evaluation, the historically constituted ‘taste’ that determines what
is capable o f appearing in the public realm and in what way, undergoes a transformation
at the hands o f dissensus, and the perceptual and logical ‘givens’ that were supposed to
be permanent. “A dissensus is not a conflict o f interests, opinions or values; it is a
division inserted in ‘common sense’: a dispute over what is given and about the frame
within which we see something as given.” (“WSR” 69) To this end Politics “re-frames
the given by inventing new ways o f making sense o f the sensible.” (“PPA” 139) With
these alterations come new possibilities for the appearance o f subjects and new criteria
for what is publically comprehensible. The speech, action, and judgments that registered
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as dissonant within the given world can appear, find ears and eyes before which they are
recognized as actors.

2.9 Conclusion
Far from being restricted to the ‘givens’ o f the shared world, as the normative
force o f common sense dictates, Rancièreian “politics breaks with the sensory selfevidence o f the ‘natural’ order that destines specific groups o f people to occupy positions
o f rule or o f being ruled, assigning them to private or public lives, pinning them down to
a certain time and space, to specific bodies, that is, to specific ways o f being, seeing and
saying.” (“PPA” 139) Rancière’s work reveals that while political community, which
separates the public from the private, relies on a partitioning o f the sensible world, i.e, on
the distribution o f the sensible, this very partition supports forms o f domination whose
contestation requires submitting the sertsus communis to acts o f dissensus by those
excluded from publicity. Such acts differ from judgments because they do not seek
impartial agreement with the public inter-est, but stage dis-agreements with the very
aesthetic coordinates the make publically comprehensible judgments possible. The
possibility o f political subjectification, I have argued, through which the sans-parts can
come to claim a place in the public realm, relies on the transformability o f the a priori
sensible coordinates o f aesthetic community, a transformability that is not radically
enough pursued in Arendt’s account o f the sens us communis.
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3

Ch. 4: Emancipation: Is the Sublime Political?

Several recent commentators on Rancière’s work have suggested that his concept
o f dissensus can be understood in terms o f the Kantian experience o f the sublime, and
this chapter questions the appropriateness of this association. Although Rancière opposes
the sedimentation o f consensus and the reification o f forms o f sociability, and tries
account for the insertion o f radical difference in the public realm, he does not, for all that,
succumb to the depoliticizing aporias o f the unrepresentable. While it might appear that
the sublime, like dissensus, constitutes “a break between sense and sense,” in which the
‘sense’ o f sensible intuition does not accord with the conceptual sense-making o f the
understanding, the sublime is a break with sensibility altogether. Dissensus, does not
break with sensibility, so much as engender collisions between alternate modes of
sensing-with.

In his recent writing, Rancière has engaged polemically with theories that link
politics to the ‘ethico-religious’ thematics of the radically ‘Other’, which he links to the
Kantian sublime. He has accused thinkers from Lyotard to Agamben, from Lacan to
Derrida, o f abandoning the immanence o f political dissensus for an ‘infinitizing’ of
alterity and ‘absolutizing’ o f wrong, or injustice. Whether in the form o f the ‘differend’
or the ‘state o f exception’, the ‘Real’ or the ‘to come’, the creative and productive
dimension o f political dissensus is foreclosed in the name o f ethical transcendence.

o

Katherine Wolfe, “From Aesthetics to Politics: Rancière, Kant, and Deleuze.” (2006) Davide Panagia,
The Potetics o f Political Thinking. (2006)
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The temptation to link political dissensus to the sublime is an understandable one.
If Arendt cultivates a consensualist vision out o f the sociability at the heart o f Kant’s
theory o f the beautiful, as I argued in the previous chapter, might we not conclude that
she overlooks that the moment ‘antisocial’ disruption present in the Analytic o f the
Sublime? Beginning with an examination o f the attempts to make out o f dissensus a
politics o f the Kantian sublime, this chapter ultimately argues that dissensus is more
appropriately understood in terms o f Kant’s Analytic o f the Beautiful, albeit in a moment
therein that Arendt failed to take up. In this way, we return to the link that Arendt makes
between politics and aesthetic sociability from a different angle, one that treats sociability
as transformable by those who are not included in it. Dissensus turns out to be a source of
heterogeneity that does not require taking flight from the sensible world into the
supersensible or unrepresentable, but folds back on the realm o f sociability and alters the
coordinates o f the sensus communis. Drawing from some o f Ranciére’s writings over the
last several years I, finally, attempt to show that Ranciére’s concept o f dissensus has
greater affinities with the feeling o f ‘disinterest’, constitutive o f the Kantian experience
o f the beautiful, than it does with the sublime.

In Arendt’s appropriation o f Kant’s ‘Analytic o f the Beautiful’, impartiality and
disinterest play complimentary roles, and are at times even treated as the same:
“Impartiality in Kant is called disinterestedness.” (LKP 70) Against this complementarity,
I point to several places in Ranciére’s recent work that suggest that he dissociates
disinterest and impartiality, drawing attention to a negative moment in aesthetic
experience found in the neither. ..nor structure o f disinterest (neither the concepts o f the
understanding nor the supersensible Ideas o f morality). I argue that this moment o f
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dissensus at the core o f Kantian aesthetics both accounts for the ruptures in common
experience (dis-inter-est), and avoids falling into an ethico-messianism o f the sublime
Event. In spite o f the emphasis that I have put thus far on those features o f Rancière’s
thought that are to be shaiply distinguished from Arendt’s, my hope is to facilitate an
understanding o f Arendt and Rancière as united in their pursuit o f a politics entirely
immanent to the sensible world, a pursuit, moreover, that rigorously separates politics
from the thematics o f unrepresentable alterity.

3.1

Dissensus as the Kantian Sublime?

In her essay “From Aesthetics to Politics: Rancière, Kant, Deleuze”, Katherine
Wolfe points to a number o f affinities between Rancière’s ‘aesthetics o f politics’ and
Kant’s critical philosophy, dealing with both the first and third Critiques. She suggests
that “Rancière's attention to the eruption o f voices, of sights, o f people, and more,
\

unsanctioned by any historical partitioning o f the sensible-in other words, Rancière's
insistence that politics can and does happen-may not be unlike Kant's encounter with a
distinct aesthetics via the sublime in the Critique o f Judgment. (Wolfe, “FPA” 1) Wolfe
interprets the ‘discord’ or non-agreement o f the faculties (of imagination and
understanding) in the Kantian sublime precisely as a disruption o f common sense: “to
posit something that can be thought but not imagined is to encounter a moment o f discord
between the faculties. This moment o f discord would be a moment o f experience outside
the dominion o f common sense.” (Wolfe, “FPA” 1)
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Likewise, David Panagia, in his Poetics o f Political Thinking (2005), sees the
aesthetics at the heart o f Rancière’s politics as an aesthetics o f the sublime. In his view,
“Rancière articulates the emergence o f democratic politics in terms o f sublime
dissonance.” (PPT 88) He continues to claim that “Rancière treats the sublime as the sine
qua non o f political action, precisely because o f its divisive nature.” {PPT 88) The
experience o f the sublime, in Kant, does not carry with it the promise o f being
accommodated by the imagination and the sensus communis, as the experience of the
beautiful does. “[Njatrual beauty,” explains Kant,

carries with it a purposiveness in its form, through which the object seems as it
were to be predetermined for our power of judgment, whereas that which,
without any rationalizing, merely in apprehension, excites in us the feeling of
the sublime may to be sure appear in its form to be contrapurposive for our
power of judgment, unsuitable for our faculty of presentation, and as it were
doing violence to the imagination. {C PJ129)

This is what Panagia has in mind when he asserts that “the sublime is antisocial, then,
because it is dissociative: it disorients our minds to such a degree that we find ourselves
in a state o f indiscemability that not only disrupts our mental faculties (most noticeably
our capacity to judge) but also interrupts society as an organic and historical force.” {PPT
86) Panagia is correct that “the separation from all society” is, for Kant, “regarded as
something sublime if it looks to ideas that rest beyond all sensible interest.” (CPJ 157)
Nevertheless, as I shall attempt to illustrate, it is a mistake to interpret Rancière’s political
dissensus as ‘anti-social’. Dissensus is concerned neither with the withdrawal from
sociability nor with the departure from the sensible. Rather, as we have seen, it generates
different forms o f sociability and reconfigurations of the sensible by twisting the
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immanent forms o f common sensibility. It introduces a heterogeneous sensorium that
carries with it the promise o f becoming sensible in an altered partage.

Without doubt, the attempt to make out o f the Kantian sublime a definitive model
o f dissensual political activity is bolstered by the obvious affinities between Rancière’s
concept o f dis-agreement and Lyotard’s concept o f the ‘différend’ (différend). Lyotard’s
différend draws heavily from the Kantian sublime as the encounter with the
unrepresentable, and signifies the impossibility o f ‘phrasing’ a wrong for which a
common sense, as the guarantor o f communication, is lacking. Such encounters announce
the limits o f the existing representational frameworks, in a similar manner to political dis
agreements, in Rancière’s sense:

In the differend, something ‘asks’ to be put into phrases, and suffers from the
wrong o f not being able to be put into phrases right away. This is when the
human beings who thought they could use language as an instrument of
communication learn through the feeling of pain which accompanies silence...
that they are summoned by language, not to augment to their profit the
quantity of information communicable through existing idioms, but to
recognize that what remains to be phrased exceeds what they cap presently
phrase, and that they must be allowed to institute idioms which do not yet
exist. (DFD 13)

The notion o f the differend evokes the dissonant, divisive interruptions o f communication
reminiscent o f Kant’s ‘Analytic o f the Sublime’, which unlike the experience o f the
beautiful, cannot appeal to the existing resources o f judgment with which it is not
commensurate. “Bom from a wrong and is signaled by a silence,” it announces a tear in
the seamless fabric o f the consensual community. (DFD 57)

The fact that Lyotard’s emphasis on the moments in which communication is
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rendered impossible has led some to construct a similar tension between his and Arendt’s
work to the one that I have been constructing between her work and Ranciere’s. Andrew
Cutrofello, in this regard, contrasts Arendt’s universal communicability o f taste with
Lyotard’s emphasis on the ‘incommensurability’ o f idioms or ‘phrase universes’.10

Where Arendt likens political opinions to Kantian judgments about the
beautiful, Lyotard compares political expressions to judgments about the
sublime... Tlie difference is that the feeling of sublimity is itself an experience
of conflict, of disharmony, of that which interrupts our usual practices and
ways o f thinking. By likening political discourse to a discourse about the
sublime, Lyotard stresses the elements o f heterogeneity and conflict that are as
much a part of the telos of politics as its means. (Cutrofello, “IHR” 276)

I do not dispute that Lyotard’s ‘différend’ contrasts with Arendt’s thoroughly
communicative, even consensual conception of political interlocution. However, the
choice between the absence o f radical difference, and a difference so radical it cannot be
communicated, presupposes the immobility o f the parameters o f political community qua
common sense.

In any case, despite definite similarities, Ranciere’s project must be differentiated
from that o f Lyotard. Jean-Louis Déotte’s 2004 essay, “The Difference Between
Rancière’s Mésentente and Lyotard’s D ifférend’ underlines the nature o f Rancière’s
departure from Lyotard. Like Wolfe and Panagia, Déotte recognizes the divisive,
negative moment constitutive o f Ranciere’s politics: “Based on a system o f sensibility
apparently founded in nature (the police and its partitioning o f the sensible), political
appearances consist o f a de-localization, a displacement, a dis-identification, almost an

10

Andrew Cutrofello, David Ingram.

70

uprooting, so that wrong can be exposed.” (Déotte, “DJR” 84) But Déotte also differs
from them in acknowledging that the divisive function in Rancière’s politics is only one
o f its two constitutive moments11. At the same time that political subjects upset the
existing world, in Rancière’s thought, “they invent a new world, new territories, and thus
a new sensitivity (aisthesis), i.e., a different division o f the sensible.” (Déotte, “DJR” 84)
While Lyotard does insist on the need to ‘institute idioms which do not yet exist’, in
which the unsayable and the senseless can be said and come to make sense, and suggests
that this may be the task o f politics, he fails to provide the mechanisms that could
adequately account for such institutions. Without a systematic account o f the processes
capable o f bringing the silent wrong into communication with the existing situation,
Lyotard’s differend risks absolutizing heterogeneity and difference. And “in contrast to
Lyotard, Rancière assumes that every voice is potentially articulable, and thus that the
wrong that exists because o f the difference between voice and speech can be transformed
into litigation.” (Déotte, “DJR” 80)

This inability on the part o f Lyotard may be symptomatic o f his modeling o f the
differend on the Kantian sublime, which treats the limits o f the sensible and the
understandable as transcendental and unchangeable. Kant’s very recourse to the
supersensible suggests that the experience o f the sublime rests on the presupposition that
the exiting common sense-the contingent limits o f representation-cannot be transformed

li

Not temporal, but structural moments - that is, moments that coincide.

71

to accommodate something so radically other, and must therefore be overcome.

12

The

recourse to an “abstract presentation, which becomes entirely negative in regard to the
sensible,” and that effects “the elimination o f the limits o f sensibility,” signals a departure
from, and not a transformation o f the limits o f the sensible. (C P J 156) Such
transformations, however, are the essence o f Rancière’s concept o f dissensus. And as
Nancy Fraser argues-in defense o f Arendt, it is worth noting-“an idea.. .that resists all
possible representation has an air o f surplus paradox suited better to religion than to
politics.” (C P J 169)

3.2

Why the Sublime is not Political for Rancière

What is important, for Rancière, is that in Kant the sublime “signaled the passage
from the aesthetic to the moral sphere.” {AD 127) Given that the aesthetic and the
political are coextensive, in his view, this passage also marks a departure from the
political to the non-political, from the properly political realm o f the sensible and
common sense to the extra-political, moral realm o f the supersensible, “where reason,” as
Kant says, “must exercise dominion over sensibility.” (C P J 151) In the experience of the
sublime, it is the power o f the imagination which is ‘sacrificed’ for the ‘enlargement’ and
‘power’ o f moral Ideas. (C P J 152) Dissensus, however, does not ‘sacrifice’ the power of

12

Such a presupposition leads Kant to link the sublime to the Judaic ban on representation: “Perhaps there
is no more sublime passage in the Jewish Book o f the Law than the commandment: Thou shalt not make
unto thyself any graven image, nor any likeness either of that which is in heaven, or on the earth, or yet
under die earth etc.” {CPJ 156)
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the same time emphasizing the point at which he departs from them. With regard to the
attempt to think the interruption o f radical heterogeneity into the reigning consensus or
mode o f being-with, Rancière explains the following:

My attempt is distinguished from that of certain others with similar historical
experiences and proximate problems and formulations by a difference in
conceiving the heterogeneous, by a way o f conceiving it that does not ascribe
it another ontological power. I have tried to conceive heterogenesis through a
type of activity that produces shocks between worlds, but shocks between
worlds in the same -world', re-distributions, re-compositions, and re
configuration of elements, [italics added] (“UD” 212)

Although his conception o f politics pivots around certain breaks in the sensible and
disruptions o f the aesthetic support o f communicative rationality, “nevertheless, for
Rancière the specificity o f politics springs from communicational stakes.” (DJR 79) The
re-distribution o f the historical a priori elements that compose and organize collective
experience is first and foremost an action, a practice, and a construction. Dissensus is not
a strictly negative political force, but only negates, divides, and interrupts as part o f a new
creation.
\

To this end, Rancière finds himself much closer to Arendt than he may be willing
to admit. Politics, in spite o f being a disruptive force, always folds back on the sensible
world, on creation, and the beginning o f something new, albeit with the caveat that the
conditions for the emergence o f the new and for creative action are radicalized to
comprise interruptions o f common sense and the public realm, rather than its preservation
and enrichment. Arendt and Rancière are, as I have attempted to demonstrate, united in
dismissing the sublime as a model o f politics, and in placing the political squarely in the
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realm o f (common) sensibility, which has no need o f deferring to, or being concerned
with the supersensible.

3.3

Democracy and Dissensus: Revolution Beyond the Sublime

The tension between Rancière’s politics and the politics o f the unrepresentable
Other is perhaps most legible in his effort to re-conceptualize democracy. He is emphatic
about the rigorous distinction between democracy as it is normally conceived, namely, its
alignment with consensus, and his own conception of democracy as the subjectification
or becoming subject o f the demos. “Consensus,” he explains, “is thus not another manner
o f exercising democracy, less heroic and more pragmatic: one does not ‘practice’
democracy except under the form o f these mises-en-scenes that reconfigure the relations
o f the visible and the sayable, that create new subjects and supplementary objects.
Consensus, thus understood, is the negation o f the democratic basis for politics: it desires
\

to have well-identifiable groups with specific interests, aspirations, values, and ‘culture’.”
(“DW” 125) Unlike the broadly ‘liberal’ conceptions o f democracy, the ‘people’ or
demos on behalf o f whom Rancièrian democracy is practiced do not pre-exist their
appearance in the public world. Moreover, they do not ‘discuss’ and ‘debate’ existing
matters o f public concern, but introduce new objects and new issues that were previously
not pertinent to public life. Rather than taking place within the reigning ‘givens’ of the
public sphere, “democracy is a form for constructing dissensus over ‘the given’ o f public
life.” (DA 56) Rancière thereby links democracy with “the existence o f a public place that
is never definitively established.” (Déotte, “DJR” 73)
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But just as democracy is not, for Rancière, the order and preservation of
consensus-with its attendant disagreements over interests and values-neither is it the
explosive eruption o f the masses, the Event o f revolution, or the ‘messianism without a
messiah’ o f Derrida’s democracy ‘to come’. In a recent essay, Rancière has addressed the
question o f the relationship between democracy and the ‘ethics of the Other’ directly,
which deals largely with the difference between Derrida’s and his own conceptions of
democracy. In relation to the concept of democracy, Rancière explains the following:
“The main issue, in my view, is whether it will be conceptualized in political or ‘ethical’
terms. If we conceptualize it politically, then the ‘infinite respect for the other’ cannot
take the form o f an infinite wait for the Event or the Messiah, but instead the democratic
shape o f an otherness that has a multiplicity of forms o f inscription and o f forms of
alteration or dissensus.” (“DDM” 61) We should not be misled, therefore, into
concluding that Rancière conceives o f politics as impervious to radical alterity. Rather,
the very importance o f democracy for his project lies in his conception o f the demos, not
as the totality o f constituted actors within a given polity, but as the becoming-seen and
becoming-heard o f other subjects, along with their proper objects o f concern. For
Rancière, “there is not one infinite openness to the otherness, but instead many ways of
inscribing the part o f the other. In my own work,” he explains, “I have tried to
conceptualize democratic practice as the inscription o f the part o f those who have no
part.. .such an inscription is made by subjects who are ‘newcomers’, who allow new
objects to appear as common concerns, and new voices to appear and be heard.” (“DDM”
60)
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3.3.1

Dissensus and Dis-inter-est

Returning to the main issue at hand, namely, the different conceptions o f politics
and ethics that emerge from the first half o f Kant’s third Critique, I would like to draw
attention to Rancière’s interpretation o f the ‘Analytic o f the Beautiful’. As I have
attempted to demonstrate in the first and second chapters, Arendt’s appropriation Kant’s
‘Analytic’ finds in it the seeds o f consensus; not in the sense of everyone agreeing and
argument no longer taking place, but in the sense that the judgments o f the beautiful
reveal a common sense or sensus communis that constitutes an a priori consensus on the
communicable and incommunicable. But is Kant’s ‘Analytic’, with its emphasis on
communicability and sensus communis, limited to this interpretation? Interestingly,
Rancière points precisely to it for an elementary articulation o f the nature, not of
consensus, but o f dissensus. Perhaps surprisingly, Rancière argues that “Dissensus, i.e.,
the rupture o f a certain agreement between thought and the sensible, already lies at the
core o f aesthetic agreement and repose.” (AD 98)

What is important for Rancière is that with regard both to ‘the law o f the
understanding’ and ‘the law o f sensation’, Kantian “aesthetic experience suspends both
laws at the same time. It therefore suspends the power relations which usually structure
the experience o f the knowing, acting and desiring subject.” (AD 97) Rancière calls this
double suspension the ‘neither-nor ’ o f aesthetic beauty. It is the detachment or separation
from the normal modes o f understanding and evaluating that defines the ‘disinterest’
proper to the experience o f the beautiful in Kant. Far from seeing it as the root o f a
consensus, “the ‘free agreement’ between understanding and the imagination is in itself
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already a disagreement or dissensus. It is not necessary to go looking in the sublime
experience o f size, power or fear to discern a disagreement between thought and the
sensible.” (AD 97) The ‘free-play’ o f the faculties is initiated, on Rancière’s reading,
precisely by the negation o f their normal functioning.

Rancière overtly opposes ‘political’ revolutions to the revolution in the forms of
sensibilities that he sees at work in Kantian aesthetic free-play. “The neither... nor ...
specific to the aesthetic state.. .announces a wholly new revolution: a revolution in the
forms o f sensory existence, instead o f a simple upheaval o f the forms o f the state; a
revolution that is no mere displacement o f powers, but a neuralization o f the very forms
by which power is exercised.. .Aesthetic free play - or neutralization - defines a novel
mode o f experience that bears within it a new form o f ‘sensible’ universality and
equality.” (AD 99) This is why Rancière calls “Lyotard’s reading o f K ant...is most
certainly an attempt to efface a first political reading o f aesthetic experience.”(^47) 104)

What Rancière’s reading of Kantian aesthetics brings to light is that dissensus is
most certainly not the presentation o f the non-, or supersensible in front o f which the
schemas o f the imagination or sensus communis are destined to inadequacy. Rather, it is
the weaving o f another sensorium, heterogeneous to the exiting distribution o f the
sensible, which works o f art and political subjectification share. The aesthetics o f politics
lies in the construction o f another common sense, and not simply in the negative rupture
o f the existing one. In the process o f dissensus, “assemblage o f data and the intertwining
o f contradictory relations are intended to produce a new sense o f community,” a new
communal sense. (ER 58)
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To this end, it is noteworthy that, in his more recent Political Life o f Sensation
(2009), Panagia has reevaluated his understanding the relationship between Kant’s
aesthetics and Rancière’s politics. It would appear that he has abandoned his
identification o f the sublime with political dissensus, and developed on a concept of
‘indistinction’ (grounded in the experience of disinterest), which signifies the sensible
presentation o f something foreign to the normal coordinates o f sensory experience within
a given sensus communis. Panagia, in this text, sees the Kantian experience of the
beautiful as

a disjunctive moment when we are unable to make the kinds of distinctions
necessary to establish an interest in an object, including any antecedent
relation like tradition, context, function. Indeed, Kant’s commitment to
disinterest goes so far as to assert that we must be indifferent to the existence
of the object, and though Kant readily admits that we exist within a substratum
of sensorial affinities that organize our world according to norms and practices
of sense making, aesthetic experience is such that it interrupts those networks
o f relation by creating a temporal and temporary state of indistinction. [italics
added] {PLS 29)

If Arendt’s analyisis focuses on impartiality, on the indexing o f particular judgments to
the positive configuration o f public sensibility, Rancière focuses on dis-interest,
detachment, the neither-nor, i.e., the negative moment o f aesthetic judgment. But
negative here does not mean ‘outside’ or ‘beyond’ the sensible, but a sensible
presentation that does not agree with the existing one. It is as a sensatation, as Panagia
describes ‘indistinction’, a sensible presentation o f something ‘other’ than what we are
used to experiencing, that dissensus interrupts the normal, indeed, normative sensory
coordinates o f community.
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Crucially, the ‘neither... nor’ of aesthetic experience, the same one in which Arendt
discovered the immanence o f the political to the sociability constituted through the
aesthetic, is, for Rancière, “what enables the mediation specific to Kantian common sense
to be turned into the positive principle o f a new form o f existence.” {AD 99) For Arendt,
disinterest revealed a ‘publicness’ at the core o f the experience o f judgment, which is
purified both o f private and idiosyncratic ‘agreeableness’ and universal, moral ‘interests’
alike. This purification o f interests reveals a sociability, a public inter-est at the core of
human experience. But, as we have seen, this perhaps overlooks a disjunctive moment in
that very same experience, the ramifications o f which she is not concerned in drawing
out. Disinterest, I have contend, is also a dis-inter-est, a break with the self-evident
knowledge o f the ‘objective’ sensory givens and objects o f public perception that bind
community as an inter-est; a break that opens sensory community for the introduction of
foreign subjects and objects. As Rancière explains, aesthetics “has been conceptualized
by K ant... in terms o f disconnection: there is something that escapes the normal
conditions o f sensory experience. That is what was at stake in emancipation: getting out
o f the ordinary ways o f sensory experience.” (Rancière, “AGE”, 71) Witnessing an act
like the plebian secession from the Aventine, or seizing o f commercial and public space
by the sans-papiers in France, Rancière shows, shares with the experience o f exceptional
works o f art the quality o f a disconnection from our normal, common sense ways of
perceiving and imparting meaning on the world around us. To the extent that such
disconnections open up a new sense o f what is collectively possible, they are the very
stakes o f politics.
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Rancière’s refusal to identify his politics with the aesthetics o f the sublime is an
important one, and it is one that commentators on his work seem to neglect. It reveals a
proximity to Arendt and her commitment to the immanence o f politics to the sensible
world. Politics, for Rancière, does not merely break with the existing forms o f experience
constituted by common sense, announcing the ‘superpower’ o f the Event or the Messiah.
Rather, “politics creates a new form, as it were, o f dissensual commonsense.” (“PPA”
139) The stakes o f Rancière’s politics remain bound to sensible to community and what
can be immanently produced therein. Granted, this immanence is not saturated in the
way that Arendt’s is, in so far as it is characterized by decisive points o f rupture and
radical re-configuration, which tear at the sensory fabric o f community. But this should
not mislead us into overemphasizing the difference between the two thinkers. As is
manifest in their readings o f Kant’s aesthetics, they simply pick up on two different
moments constitutive o f the same phenomenon: the aesthetic founding (Arendt) and re
founding (Rancière) o f political community.

3.4 Conclusion

Badiou accuses Rancière o f being overly ‘historicist’ for not positing the aleatory
emergence o f an Event or a Derridean ‘to come’. (Badiou, MP 116) This may be true, but
as I tried to explain in the second chapter o f this work, Rancière’s historicism relies on a
conception o f history that, while constituting the aesthetic coordinates o f the shared
sensible world, can be ‘re-constituted’, transformed, and altered. This conception of
history, not as monolithic and all-conditioning, but as mobile and susceptible to
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intervention (albeit rare) by political subjects, does not need to appeal the Event to
conceptualize the manner in which otherness can transform and come to be inscribed in
the historical world. Aesthetico-political processes engage in such inscriptions wherever
they arise: on the Aventine in ancient Rome, in the banlieu o f Paris, in the households of
women confined to private space.

Recourse to the ‘ethico-religious’ is not necessary if the coordinates o f the
intelligible, the ‘schemas’ o f imagination, are susceptible to alteration. The problem with
the feeling o f the sublime as model o f politics is that the very experience o f the sublime,
as theorized by Kant, is already a concession o f the transcendence and ahistoricality of
the forms o f sensible experience. It is accompanied by a ‘pain’ at not being able to
synthesize and comprehend what is being apprehended, but a pain that calls the subject to
higher purpose, namely the thinking of the unrepresentable. But this recourse to a ‘higher
calling’, the calling o f an ethics o f Other, presupposes that it is not possible to bring that
which lies beyond the current community of sensation, into communication with a new
one. This is the presupposition that Rancière rejects, and that, in my View, qualifies his
thought as properly political.

4

Conclusion

This thesis has sought to unfold the consequences o f the insight, provided by both
Arendt and Rancière, that politics is always and inherently bound up with the aesthetic,
with shared modalities o f sensing the ‘given’ world. These modalities determine what can
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be communicated and what cannot, and shape the coordinates o f the visible, the audible,
and thus the possible. Throughout, I have tried to show how Rancière enables the
articulation o f a conception o f politics that consists, not only o f what unfolds inside the
communicative space opened up by the sharing o f a sensus communis, but o f those
processes capable o f contesting and transforming it. Left uncontested, I have argued,
‘common sense’ risks reifying into a sense o f a world whose self-evident ‘givens’ are
beyond dispute. This is a world whose constituted participants and determinate objects of
concern acquire a quasi-transcendent status that, by ‘policing’ the border between the
perceptible and the imperceptible, forecloses the appearance o f new subjects - of
‘newcomers’, as Rancière calls them.

Dissensus, which involves a process o f subjectification that constitutes previously
non-existent subjects (according to the perceptual framework o f the existing public
realm), relies on the ability to bend, twist, and rend aesthetic community. I have shown
that Arendt’s aesthetics o f the public realm does not enable such processes, while
Rancière’s historically situated, yet simultaneously non-historicized account of the sensus
communis produces borders o f aesthetico-political community that are mobile and
transformable. But I have also tried to cast Arendt and Rancière as united against the
contemporary tendency to subordinate politics to problematics that are fundamentally
ethical. Perhaps no other two thinkers have shown an equal concern for the preservation
o f the integrity politics, as distinct from those phenomena, in both theory practice, with
which it is all too often confused.
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